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ABSTRACT 
Often cited as the largest machine in the world, the electric power grid is a complex 
system, integral to modern life. Continuous technology advancements over the past hundred 
years have delivered improvements to both the system itself, e.g., wide-area management 
systems (WAMS), as well as modeling capabilities in order to better understand how that system 
functions. Phenomena that could once be simulated only in small, localized settings can now be 
studied from a wide-area perspective. 
Chapter 1 briefly introduces the three major U.S. electric interconnections along with 
wide-area power system analysis tools and the benchmarked models used in this work. It also 
puts forward two topics that wide-area modeling must address: the effect of generation portfolio 
changes on dynamic system response and the assessment and hardening of the grid against high-
impact, interconnection-wide events. 
The first topic is investigated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Specifically, Chapter 2 
examines dynamic response repercussions of the recent shift from coal-fired generation plants to 
natural gas turbines. Chapter 3 extends this discussion to the increase in low-inertia renewable 
sources. 
Modeling and analysis of wide-area events in line with the second topic, including 
extreme weather phenomena, solar storms, and physical attacks, as well as methodologies to 
harden the grid, are investigated in the remainder of this work. Chapter 4 begins with an example 
of modeling geomagnetically induced current (GIC) effects while Chapter 5 discusses high-
altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) components and impacts. Chapter 6, guided by the 2015 
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, extends the scope of these scenarios and 
presents a methodology to find the most critical elements for any given system and determine the 
minimum required spare large power transformer (LPT) reserve that should be available. 
Conclusions and potential future research directions are presented in Chapter 7. 
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 1 
: INTRODUCTION 
The electric power grid is a complex system, integral to modern life. Sustained 
development since the first alternating current (AC) transmission system over 100 years ago [1] 
has earned the grid the title of the largest machine in the world [2]. Continuous technological 
advancements allow improvements to both the system itself, e.g., wide-area management 
systems (WAMS), as well as modeling capabilities. The former increases the efficiency and 
control capabilities of the grid from electricity generation to end-use consumption. The latter 
provides deeper understanding of how the system works at a fundamental level.  
Phenomena that once could be simulated only in a small, localized setting can now be 
studied from a wide-area perspective—often even in real time. Two related topics immediately 
rise to the forefront when considering such a perspective: future buildout scenarios and extreme 
event analysis. 
Inquiry into the first seeks to answer the question of how changes in infrastructure will 
effect electric grid performance. With the recent shift in generation portfolios toward fuel 
sources that produce lower CO2 emissions than traditional coal-fired plants, this is a timely issue. 
The second topic relies on similar wide-area models to focus on the response of the 
present grid to high impact events. Geomagnetically induced current (GIC), high-altitude 
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) detonations, and interconnection-wide security and resiliency 
assessments all require analysis techniques capable of evaluating impacts across the entire 
system. 
1.1 An Introduction to the U.S. Interconnections 
The United States is divided into three dynamically isolated, three-phase, 60 Hz 
alternating current electric grids: the Eastern Interconnection (EI), the Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council (WECC), and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The EI 
extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains—minus most of Texas which, as the 
name implies, is run by ERCOT—and from Florida to parts of Canada. WECC covers the rest of 
the continental U.S. and a large western section in Canada. Alaska and Hawaii are not members 
of an interconnection, but are both subdivided by geography into multiple island-like grids [3]. 
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Figure 1.1. A map of the North American Interconnections and EROs 
 
1.1.1 Interconnection Governance 
WECC and ERCOT both have a central governing council for reliability concerns, 
WECC and Texas Reliability Entity, Inc. (TRE), respectively. The EI is composed of six 
independent regional entities (EROs). The location of each is shown in Figure 1.1 [3]. All six of 
these reliability bodies must meet standards set by the North American Electricity Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) under the oversight and authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). One requirement is the creation of interconnection planning models with 
both load flow (steady state) and dynamic information for all elements that are a part of the bulk 
electric system (BES) [4]. Typically the summer peak load model is considered the most 
important with the winter peak load model coming in as a close second. Spring shoulder load 
models are also used, but not produced for every study year. 
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1.1.2 Industry Planning Models 
As the sole EROs in their interconnections, the models released by WECC and ERCOT 
are considered definitive and referred to simply as the WECC and ERCOT models, respectively. 
In the EI, the Multiregional Modeling Working Group (MMWG), under the oversight of the 
Eastern Interconnection Reliability Assessment Group (ERAG), is responsible for developing 
models for the interconnection [5]. Due to the size of the EI, the full 60,000 three-phase bus 
MMWG model is often equivalized to reduce model complexity. Depending on the purpose of 
the study and the geographical area of interest, significant compression is possible. 
This work utilizes models from all three interconnections kindly provided through the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Dominion Virginia Power (DVP), Energy Visuals, Inc., and 
FERC. In all cases, industry models are made available through non-disclosure agreements 
(NDAs) that require that no detailed parameters from the models be released. Under the 
agreements, results and analysis may still be discussed, provided no critical energy infrastructure 
information (CEII) is disclosed. 
1.1.3 Simulation Tools 
The main analysis tool used in this work for both power flow and dynamic simulation is 
PSS®E (Power System Simulation for Engineers). This software suite is based in Fortran 
(FORTRAN at the time) with an extensive Python application programing interface (API). All 
MMWG and ERCOT models are specifically designed with PSS®E in mind and it is generally 
considered the gold standard for power system simulation by engineers in those regions. WECC 
prioritizes PSLF (Power System Load Flow) as the main power flow engine for interconnection 
studies, but ensures all cases also run correctly in PSS®E. 
Harmonic load flow is conducted in ETAP (Electrical Transient and Analysis Program). 
Hardware-in-the-loop electromagnetic transient program (EMTP) simulations are 
designed in RSCAD (Real-time Simulation Computer Aided Design) and run on RTDS (Real-
time Digital Simulator). 
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: DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF THE EASTERN 
INTERCONNECTION’S TRANSITION FROM COAL TO NATURAL GAS 
The generation profile of America’s power grids is changing. Over the last decade, many 
synchronous coal-fired plants have been retired and replaced by other fuel forms [6]. While 
steady state power flow analysis may yield similar results after this shift—postulating general 
topology and generation levels remain similar, without respect to fuel type—dynamic simulation 
will not [7], [8]. Differing control structures and inertia constants strongly affect system response 
and oscillation damping. The effects of these changes are generally considered muted by large, 
strongly connected systems such as the Eastern Interconnection (EI), but the scale of the current 
generation shift is unprecedented [9]. In Tennessee, electricity generated from natural gas 
increased over four-fold in 2012 alone and is replacing coal as the dominant fuel resource [10]. 
This trend holds true across most of the country and the United States Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) predicts that every state will pivot away from coal-fueled electricity 
generation, whether to natural gas-fueled generation or not, in the near future [6]. 
Motivating Factors behind this Shift 
This shift has several underlying causes, but the dual prime drivers are Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations and the rise of hydraulic fracturing (fracking). 
The EPA finalized the Cross-state Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) in July 2011 and the 
Mercury and Air Toxic Standards (MATS) in December of the same year. CSAPR requires 
power plants that contribute to air quality pollution in other states to reduce ozone and fine 
particle emissions [11]. MATS requires power plants to limit emissions of mercury, arsenic, and 
metals [12]. After the Supreme Court upheld CSAPR [13], utilities filed reports of their plans to 
shift generator fuel types away from coal [9]. The EPA subsequently proposed standards for CO2 
emissions from electrical power generation with the Clean Power Plan in June 2014 and released 
the final version in August 2015. The Clean Power Plan is intended to reduce CO2 emissions 
from electrical power generation sources by 32% by 2030, relative to 2005 levels [14]. While the 
Clean Power Plan faces legal challenges, some stakeholders are already moving toward 
implementation [15]-[23]. 
 5 
Burning methane (natural gas) produces about half the CO2 emissions as burning coal, 
giving natural gas a distinct advantage in conversations about greenhouse gas emissions [24]. 
This advantage now extends to economic concerns due to the ubiquitous expansion of hydraulic 
fracturing. The sudden glut of natural gas released into the market led to a significant decrease in 
cost [6]. With the possibility of new regulations and the changes in fuel markets, utilities are 
pivoting away from coal-fired turbines in favor of other fuel sources [25]. 
Dynamic Response Degradation 
The dynamic response of the electric grid will change as the underlying generation 
infrastructure does. Coal-fired plants, which historically act as the majority baseline of the 
generation profile, respond to changes in power demand slowly, but also have the ability to 
match reactive power needs quickly. Gas turbines are historically used as smaller spinning 
reserve for the system since they have the ability to quickly change both real and reactive output 
power [1]. Gas-powered turbines have much lower inertia constants though, and the proliferation 
of baseline natural gas units and low, or zero, inertia renewable generation sources, i.e., wind 
turbines and photovoltaics, are often represented as a cause of degradation in the frequency 
response of the EI [26]. The conversation over the existence and causes of potential dynamic 
response degradation must not simply be discussed as theoretical arguments between utilities and 
vendors—the planned system must be modeled and analyzed to understand the impacts of 
shifting generation profiles on system performance and reliability. 
2.1 Impact of EPA Regulations on Frequency Response 
The six regional reliability entities across the EI provide data to the Eastern 
Interconnection Reliability Assessment Group (ERAG) so that planning studies (typically using 
a five to twenty year horizon) can be performed to ensure the reliability of the electric 
transmission system across the interconnection. The Multiregional Model Working Group 
(MMWG) is responsible for synthesizing these data into models that can be used as baseline 
planning cases. Each year the MMWG releases a set of seasonal power flow cases and associated 
dynamic model data [27]. In a previous study by Penn Markham [9], an MMWG 2010 series 
case representing the peak summer 2015 load is used to model the steady state buildout of 
several predicted scenarios caused by EPA emissions regulation. The original model contains  
 6 
 
Figure 2.1. A map of all buses in the MMWG 2010 series case for summer 2015 peak load [9] 
 
29,051 three-phase buses with 3,398 generating plants and 19,729 loads. 4,030 machines have 
associated dynamic data. Due to a set of generators with artificial upper limits of 9,999 MW, the 
total capacity of the system is immaterial, but the total system load and generation are 
580,140 MW and 589,124 MW, respectively. A map of all modeled buses is provided in Figure 
2.1 [9]. 
The initial study used information available from the Institute for Energy Research (IER), 
2010 U.S. EIA Form 860 data filings, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to locate 
and size generation sites that were expected to be retired or built [18]-[23]. A set of cases were 
created for different generation profiles and years. Each is able to converge to a solution using 
the fixed-slope decoupled Newton-Raphson method for power flow, but several of the solutions 
required swing bus operation beyond its given limits—the sign of a highly stressed system and in 
reality an infeasible set point. 
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First, base cases for the summers of 2012 through 2017 were created. These do not have 
any extra generation compared to the original 2015 MMWG case, but used the in-service date of 
each plant to determine if it should run or not and scaled the load to match expected forecasts 
[20]. Then, a set of cases were created where all coal plants expected to be shuttered by EPA 
regulations were removed from service based on the dates found in the IER, EIA, and NRC 
filings. Finally, a third set of cases was constructed where new natural gas turbines were added to 
replace coal generation. These are extensions of the second, retired coal case buildouts, except in 
the case of 2016, where the case does not converged cleanly. Instead, the coal retirement and gas 
expansion stages were combined using the 2016 base case as a starting point so that the 
numerical solver could find a stable steady state system solution. Note that new gas units are run 
close to their real power limits. These cases are identified by the last two digits of the base year 
(12-17) and the letter “a,” “b,” or “c” for base case, coal plant retirement, or additional natural 
gas units, respectively. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 summarize each of these cases. 
2.2 Dynamic Model Creation 
In this work, the dynamic data for each case are created from the summer 2015 base case 
dynamic data supplied with the original MMWG model. The data for each machine are chosen 
based on representative sampling of existing dynamic models of similarly sized machines with 
matching fuel types. The inertia constant of a machine, H, is defined as the kinetic energy stored 
in the rotating mass at nominal speed divided by the generator rating. The damping coefficient, 
D, is a measure of how strongly a machine acts to minimize any difference in the angular 
velocities of the physical rotor and the air gap field [45]. Table 2.3 shows the range of inertia and 
damping values found across both the retired coal units and the additional natural gas generators. 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of yearly base case changes versus original MMWG model 
Case Year Capacity Change (MW) Total Load (MW) 
12a 2012 +13,328 554,798 
13a 2013 +14,809 563,120 
14a 2014 +10,571 571,567 
15a 2015 - 580,140 
16a 2016 +632 588,842 
17a 2017 +722 597,675 
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Table 2.2. Summary of case changes inside each year  
Case Year Retired Coal (MW) Additional Gas (MW) 
12a 2012 - - 
12b 2012 2,489 - 
12c 2012 2,489 5,732 
13a 2013 - - 
13b 2013 2,489 - 
13c 2013 2,489 6,354 
14a 2014 - - 
14b 2014 6,685 - 
14c 2014 6,685 7,174 
15a 2015 - - 
15b 2015 19,043 - 
15c 2015 19,043 10,102 
16a 2016 - - 
16b 2016 20,611 - 
16c 2016 20,611 10,449 
17a 2017 - - 
17b 2017 20,611 - 
17c 2017 20,611 10,505 
 
Adapting the original MMWG summer 2015 dynamic data to align with the base cases 
for years 2012-2017 is a trivial task. Modifying the dynamic data for cases where coal plants are 
retired to meet expected MATS/CSAPR compliance actions is also fairly straightforward. For 
these eleven cases, reaching a reasonable power flow solution to act as the initialization state for 
dynamic simulation is the most challenging problem. The 2016 coal retirement case, case 16b, 
cannot reach a stable power flow solution without pushing the swing bus to over 8,000 MW of 
generation—well outside the machine’s upper limit. Since convergence in the power flow 
solution is not robust, pushing the limits of that solution even further in dynamic simulations 
produces problematic results that are discussed later 
 
Table 2.3. Range of inertia and damping constant values by fuel type 
Parameter Retired Coal Additional Gas 
Inertia (H) 0.045–9.5 0.05–1.39 
Damping (D) 1.39–10.64 1.39–12.66 
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With the next set of cases, accounting for new natural gas generation in place of retired 
coal plants requires significantly more care and several iterations of fine-tuning. It should be 
noted that the additional gas case for 2017, case 17c, like case 16b, initializes from a  
questionable power flow solution where the system is stable, but draws real power beyond the 
stated limit of the swing bus unit. 
2.3 Dynamic Simulation Results 
The frequency response of the system in each case is tested using several events. First, a 
large, dual reactor nuclear plant is dropped along the east coast. This location is both tightly tied 
to the interconnection and nearby several of the additional natural gas units in the third set of 
cases. Two representative sets of case results are discussed here. The results of this event across 
the full case suite are shown in Appendix A.  
With the loss of 2,003 MW of generation, the frequency response across the base cases 
for 2012 to 2017 is fairly similar, as seen in Figure 2.2. As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, only small 
differences in damping are created by the retirement of larger coal plants across the system. As 
seen in Appendix A, this trend continues across all cases with the exceptions of case 16b and 
case 17c. These are the two cases with infeasible swing bus operation in the power flow and 
clear stressed system markers. The anomalous dynamic behavior in both cases (visible in Figure 
2.4) is a result of their invalid initial conditions. 
The second event was a three-phase bolted fault on a 500 kV bus in the southeast, cleared 
after 5 cycles (0.8333 seconds at 60 Hz). As shown in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6, the removal of 
coal-fired units does not significantly alter frequency response, but the addition of natural gas 
turbines does noticeably improve recovery. It should be noted that in the scope of the entire 
interconnection, much of the additional natural gas-based generation is located relatively close to 
the fault location. The 50% improvement in settling frequency makes a strong argument for the 
merits of gas turbines’ fast ramping rates. This result occurs across all six years studied. 
A third event is created to examine the result of redirecting line flows and rebalancing 
output generation. The loss of a 230 kV line in the southwestern part of the EI is simulated. In all 
cases, the plotted results overlap almost perfectly—even for the clear frequency spike that marks 
automatic dispatching as seen in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8. Since case 15a is the original   
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Figure 2.2. Base case frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Year 2015 frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
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Figure 2.4. Anomalous behavior due to bad initial power flow solutions 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Base case frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
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Figure 2.6. Year 2015 frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Base case frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
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Figure 2.8. Year 2015 frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
 
MMWG model, this serves to prove the flexibility of the system and reasonableness of the 
dynamic control data added for this work. 
Finally, a fourth event representing the loss of 800 MW of load in the southeast is 
studied. As expected in a loss-of-load situation, the final system frequency rises from the original 
value. As seen in Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10, the number and timing of oscillations does not 
significantly differ, but the magnitude of each local maximum and minimum improves with each 
step further from the original case (case 15a), partially because more weight is given to 
generation from high inertia nuclear plants as coal-fired plants are removed. 
As a rule, the different build-out cases in 2015 do not have the dramatically altered 
dynamic profiles for a large (2 GW generation loss) event that were originally predicted by 
opponents of EPA emissions regulation (whether MATS, CSAPR, or the Clean Air Act). In 
reality, simulation results across most cases appear very close to each year’s base case dynamic 
frequency response. This intuitively makes sense for two reasons: First, both coal-fired and 
natural gas turbines are synchronous machines with similar control devices. The main two 
difference are output generation size—coal-fired plants are traditionally larger—and that gas 
turbines often do not have power system stabilizers (PSS) to damp forced oscillations; typically   
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Figure 2.9. Base case frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Year 2015 frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
  
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 3 6 9 12 15
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 (
H
z)
Time (seconds)
800 MW Southeast Load Shed
Case 12a
Case 13a
Case 14a
Case 15a
Case 16a
Case 17a
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 3 6 9 12 15
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 (
H
z)
Time (seconds)
800 MW Southeast Load Shed
Case 15a
Case 15b
Case 15c
 15 
their nimbler ramp rates allow them to forgo PSS control loops. Second, while a loss of 20.6 GW 
of coal-fired generation is no small event, these retirements only account for 3.5% of real power 
generation in the original MMWG model and there is enough capacity to continue meeting load 
even before the addition of natural gas units (which in cases 12c, 13c, and 14c more than make 
up for retired coal). 
The impact to system stability mainly comes from the loss of system inertia—and while a 
decrease of 3.5% may have local impacts, it barely affects the system when taken as a whole. 
Looking further into EIA predictions [6], [18], renewables (e.g., wind turbines and 
photovoltaics), which are notorious for their low inertia constants, are expected to eventually 
replace both coal-fired and gas-fired plants. Thus, stiffer widespread loss of system inertia must 
also be addressed. 
2.4 Conclusions 
EPA regulations and economic factors are together driving the shift from coal-fired 
generators to natural gas turbines. This change in fuel type does represent a measurable loss of 
inertia in the Eastern Interconnection. Local dynamic response to generation losses is worse for 
locations nearby retired/new generation sites, but the overall impact will hardly destabilize the 
electric grid and the dynamic response to load losses actually improves with the addition of 
natural gas turbines. The total system inertia of the EI is great enough to absorb the overall effect 
of the small inertia loss of changing from one synchronous generation source to another. This 
result naturally leads to the question of how switching from traditional synchronous generation 
sources to nonsynchronous renewable generation (e.g., wind turbine and solar photovoltaic) 
sources will affect the dynamic response of the system. This topic is investigated in Chapter 3. 
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: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF LOSS OF INERTIA 
AND GENERATOR CONTROLS 
Renewable generation is not merely a prediction or future goal. In 2012 alone, 
13,131 MW of wind generation capacity was constructed in the United States, bringing the total 
installed capacity to over 60 GW [28]. In 2013, wind-powered generation supplied 4.5% of the 
nation’s electricity [29]. While the business as usual case no longer aligns with the 2008 U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) goal of 20% by 2030, the total continues to grow and the agency 
still reports several potential scenarios where that goal is either met or surpassed [29], [30]. 
This sizable increase in the number of wind turbines on the grid must be met with careful 
study. At the unit level, voltage control, reactive power output, power quality requirements, and 
fault ride-through have already been considered in detail and commercial solutions are available 
to address known issues [31]-[35]. 
Potential problems for the grid as a whole must also be addressed. Traditional 
synchronous generators provide frequency control that defines the dynamic response of the EI 
through governor units, generator inertia, and exciter controls. Variable-speed wind turbines do 
not provide synchronizing torque and cannot damp oscillations as effectively as traditional 
generation because of the resulting lower inertia they have available to exert [36]-[38]. Most 
wind turbines are also not equipped with governor or exciter units [39]. As a result, a higher 
percentage of wind generation in the EI portfolio will lead to a decrease of system inertia and 
alter the interconnection’s frequency response [36]-[42]. The effects of displacing generation 
from traditional coal-fired units with variable-speed wind turbines in the EI are not 
straightforward and are thus best determined by system simulation. Generic wind turbine models 
introduce numerical instability when simulated in large quantities though. This problem can be 
avoided by starting with traditional generation models, removing governor units, decreasing 
generator inertia, and disabling exciter controls to create pseudo-models that mimic some 
characteristics of large sets of equivalized wind turbines. 
This study, originally published and discussed in [43], uses a 16,000 bus dynamic EI 
model created from an MMWG model as the base case scenario to investigate how large groups 
of wind turbines would collectively act to affect the EI dynamic frequency response. 
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3.1 EI Model and Study Scenarios 
The 16,000 bus dynamic EI model was originally created from the full MMWG model 
designed to run in PSS®E. In total, the model contains 16,013 three-phase buses and 3,248 
generators with a total generation capacity of just under 600 GW across the entire system. The 
original model does not include wind turbines. 
3.1.1 Modifications to Generator Controls and Inertia Constants 
Several generic wind turbine models exist for dynamic PSS®E simulation. For smaller 
models, these are perfectly acceptable, but substituting these generic models for traditional 
synchronous machines can create numerical instability during runs [43]. This effect compounds 
as the number of turbines grows. Due to this, the EI system is too large to employ generic models 
for high levels of wind penetration. 
Alternatively, it is possible to simulate the effect of wind farms using traditional 
synchronous generator models. By lowering the inertia constants of existing machines, the 
frequency response can be simulated. While newer wind turbines may provide voltage support 
capabilities [44], disabling the associated exciter units is also required to mimic the voltage 
support capabilities of the generic wind turbine models. 
A Python script was written to modify the base case and create two cases with this 
pseudo-wind generation model method applied throughout the system. Case 1 removes governor 
units from a percentage of generators in the system and decreases individual generators’ inertia 
constants. Case 2 covers the loss of governor units and lower unit inertia like Case 1 while 
additionally disabling a percentage of exciter control participation in the model as well. 
Four different percentages are used to scale down generator inertia constants and disable 
governor and exciter control units to simulate different levels of wind penetration in the system. 
This yields five scenarios within each of the two cases: the base case or 0% change (original 
model values; identical between case 1 and case 2), 20% scaling, 40% scaling, 60% scaling, and 
80% scaling. These percentages are simultaneously used to scale generator inertia and disable 
control units throughout the model. 
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Disturbances are introduced to the system by tripping generation or load offline. The 
frequency response and voltage profile for each event are then captured. Descriptions of specific 
events and the associated simulation results are presented in the next section. 
3.2 Simulation Results 
The events presented in this section compare the simulated EI frequency response and 
voltage profile between case 1 and case 2 (with 0% change representing the base case) during 
four loss-of-generation events and a loss-of-load event. The last two loss-of-generation events 
occur at the same plant, but represent different power imbalances, removing topological 
considerations from the comparison. 
3.2.1 Event 1: Loss of 2,550 MW Generator 
During the first event a 2,550 MW loss-of-generation scenario is simulated. The plant is 
tripped off line one second into the simulation and the frequency and voltage responses are 
recorded for each case. 
Figure 3.1 shows the case 1 frequency response profile. When 20% of inertia and 
governor control is lost, the change in frequency increases by about 50% from the base case. 
With 60% and 80% scaling, the response is further off, but the marginal difference between the 
two high percentage scenarios is small. Decreasing inertia constants of individual units does not 
significantly affect the settling frequency, but does cause the drop to occur faster with each 
successive value. 
When exciters are also disabled in case 2, shown in Figure 3.2, the same effect can be 
seen on the rate of change as in case 1. The nadir also becomes noticeably more pronounced with 
each decrease in system inertia. The settling frequency, however, is significantly altered. Without 
voltage exciters, the system compensates for a lack of VARs by ramping generation output. This 
also increases real power output and causes the frequency to rise dramatically. With only a 
portion of the base case governor control, the system takes a long time to settle. 
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Figure 3.1. Event 1, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Event 1, Case 1: Voltage response 
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Figure 3.3 presents the voltage profile of case 1 under the same contingency. The first 
oscillation still drops noticeably lower as inertia is lost, but with less inertia to push against, 
control systems are more effective than in the base case. The settling voltage is improved by 
50% to 75% under all case 1 scaling compared to the base case value. 
This is not true for case 2. As seen in Figure 3.4, the loss of exciter systems causes the 
voltage to drop dramatically. As should be expected, losing governor units and exciter systems is 
clearly detrimental to the system’s ability to keep voltage levels constant during events. 
3.2.2 Event 2: Loss of 1,517 MW Generator 
A second event is simulated for the loss of a 1,517 MW source. The same procedure is 
used as in the first event; the generator is dropped one second into the run and the frequency and 
voltage response are captured. Figure 3.5 through Figure 3.8 show the case 1 and case 2 
frequency and voltage responses. 
As with the first event, the settling frequency with 20% scaling is about 50% further from 
the nominal value than in the base case and further loss of governor control causes this gap to 
grow. The loss of governor units clearly has a measurable impact on the system that must be 
considered when planning for increased renewable penetration. 
The voltage profile in case 1 is again improved from the base case since the lower system 
inertia allows exciter systems to act more effectively. There is a noticeable ripple in the final 
voltage levels. This probably results from a small level of numerical instability in the solver, but 
may indicate that the system is physically less stable at this point. 
Removing the exciters in case 2 has a similar effect on the frequency and voltage 
response as in the previous event. Comparing the two shows that the 1,517 MW profile is 
actually worse since the 40% scaling response now groups with the 60% and 80% curves. The 
same instability seen in case 1 is present in all four scaled case 2 results, although to a lesser 
degree. 
Under a full comparison, the results of the 1,517 MW loss-of-generation event are 
consistent with those of the 2,550 MW event. 
  
 21 
 
Figure 3.3. Event 1, Case 2: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Event 1, Case 2: Voltage response 
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Figure 3.5. Event 2, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Event 2, Case 1: Voltage response 
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Figure 3.7. Event 2, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Event 2, Case 2: Voltage response   
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3.2.3 Event 3: Loss of 1,056 MW Load Site 
A loss-of-load event designed so that a 1,056 MW load site was tripped offline one 
second into the run is proffered for comparison with event 2. The four case 2 scaling scenarios 
are contrasted with the base case frequency response and voltage profiles. 
As seen in Figure 3.9, the system frequency stabilizes as fast as or faster than in the base 
case for all scaling scenarios. Losing 20% of the automated control systems throughout the EI 
leads to a significantly muted recovery after the event though. At 40%, the system barely moves 
back toward the nominal frequency and at 60%, the frequency plot simply diverges completely 
from the previous trends. As with event 2, each greater inertia scaling percentage causes the 
nadir to increase. 
The oscillations in Figure 3.10 cover a wider range than in the previous event and the 
final steady state voltages are more varied. In the 20% and 40% scaling scenarios, enough exciter 
control exists in the system to take advantage of the lower system inertia and actually improve 
the voltage response. Both curves show the same ripple as event 2. As in the frequency plot, the 
60% and 80% scaling scenarios settle at much higher values. These curves take longer to settle, 
but remain smooth. As this event again demonstrates, high penetrations of wind energy will 
require replacement control systems to take the place of traditional exciter controls. 
3.2.4 Event 4: Comparison of Responses to Different Imbalance Magnitudes 
The change in frequency experienced during an event is generally proportional to the 
imbalance of power in the system. This is observable in real measurements from the EI [45]. The 
scaling in case 1 should not negate this property. Two generators at the same station worth 
2,000 MW each are employed to create frequency drops in both the base case and case 2 for 
events with identical topology but different magnitudes. 
Figure 3.11 shows the frequency response of the base case for the loss of a single 
2000 MW unit versus dropping both units for a total 4000 MW loss. The nadir is 15.5 mHz or 
68.6% lower in the double contingency, while the settling frequency is 7.76 mHz or 70.6% 
lower. 
These values are nearly identical to those in case 1, shown in Figure 3.12, where the nadir   
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Figure 3.9. Event 3, Case 2: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Event 3, Case 2: Voltage response 
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Figure 3.11. Event 4, Base Case: Proportional frequency response 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Event 4, Case 1: Proportional frequency response 
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and settling frequency (due to lack of recovery) is 39.71 mHz or 72.8% lower than the initial 
value. 
These results, along with the analysis of the two generation trips, show that the imbalance 
of power and change in frequency remain proportional to each other, even as the relationship 
between those values changes with the inertia of the system. From this, the results of this study 
(plotted in full in Appendix B) may be scaled to find the frequency response of the EI for power 
imbalances of any size. 
3.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Increasing wind penetration in the EI lowers the average inertia of generator units and the 
percentage of generators with governor and exciter controls. This changes the characteristic 
dynamic frequency and voltage response of the system. The scenarios presented show that 
contingencies will create greater frequency oscillations and require further mitigating control to 
return post-event steady state conditions at nominal values quickly. With the current policy and 
technology implementation there is a strong limit to the support that wind turbines can provide. 
Governor and excitation systems, or their functional equivalents, must become commonly 
available and be enabled in commercial installations so that wind plants will be able to aid in 
frequency and voltage recovery. 
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: WIDE-AREA ANALYSIS OF GEOMAGNETICALLY 
INDUCED CURRENT HARMONICS 
4.1 Background 
While power system dynamics are usually studied in the context of a wide-area or 
interconnection view, investigations of many other phenomena are often limited to smaller 
models with reduced boundary conditions. One example of this is harmonic load flow for 
geomagnetically induced current (GIC) [46]-[49]. GIC is caused by geomagnetic disturbances 
(GMD), usually solar activity or other radiation from space. Electromagnetic (EM) waves 
associated with this “space weather” cause induced current in equipment with a physical ground 
connection. These elements act as sources or sinks and, compared to the 60 Hz nominal 
frequency of the grid, appear as quasi-direct current (DC) or zero-sequence sources. 
Power transformers under significant DC effects can enter half-cycle saturation. In this 
state, transformers require significantly more reactive power to maintain their internal magnetic 
fields and will inject even and odd harmonics (waveforms oscillating at multiples of the 60 Hz 
system frequency) into the grid. Half-cycle saturation carries a high potential for equipment 
damage due to the formation of thermal hot spots. 
By nature, GMD events effect a wide area—potentially covering all three U.S. 
interconnections simultaneously. Even though there is extensive research on GIC in isolated 
pieces of equipment, considering the interplay of GIC across an appropriately sized area is a 
novel approach. This chapter discusses work conducted on behalf of Dominion Virginia Power 
(DVP) to model harmonic load flow across their entire extra-high voltage (EHV) transmission 
system to capture full wide-area GIC impacts and determine what, if any, protection and control 
systems could be compromised. 
4.2 Purpose and Procedure 
Much of the existing literature on this topic was published in response to the Hydro 
Quebec blackout of 1989, which was caused by a GMD event with an aurora that could be seen 
as far south as Texas [49]. Each of these studies is concerned with the performance of a single 
transformer—none considers the effects of network-wide harmonics. They also focus heavily on 
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northern latitudes. As the association with aurora phenomena implies, GMD impact is stronger 
close to the magnetic poles and typically does not reach very far south into the continental 
United States. There are events, e.g., Virginia capacitor bank protection misoperations in 1989, 
1993, and 2003 [50], which prove exceptions. Additionally, lower order harmonic injections, 
especially at the second harmonic (120 Hz), are known to travel significant electrical distances.  
4.2.1 Demonstration of Harmonic Current Injection Interactions 
The IEEE 14 bus system [51] is enlisted to demonstrate the construction and 
deconstruction of harmonic flows from multiple sources and the necessity of a wide-area 
approach. Figure 4.1 presents a diagram of the model in ETAP, an electrical power system 
analysis and operation software capable of both load flow solutions and harmonic analysis. 
ETAP default values are substituted for any parameters missing from the original IEEE data, 
e.g., generator zero-sequence impedance. Two transformers, the unit connecting bus 4 with bus 7 
and the unit connecting bus 4 with bus 9, will act as harmonic current sources. Two cases are 
examined. In the first, the two sources are completely identical. In the second, the magnitude of 
the two sources remains identical, but the phase angle of the input harmonic currents through the 
transformer between bus 4 and bus 7 is shifted 180°. In both cases the harmonic sources on the 
magnetizing branch of the transformers inject current from the second to the ninth harmonic at 
10.00%, 5.00%, 2.50%, 1.25%, 0.63%, 0.31%, 0.15%, and 0.08% of the fundamental value, 
respectively. The injection of wide-spectrum harmonics is more material to the problem at hand 
than the exact values used. 
The base power flow solution angles at all three buses are similar (−10.3°, −13.4°, and 
−15.0°, respectively) so in the first case the harmonic currents join and create a high level of 
voltage THD throughout the system. In the second, the harmonic currents have disparate phase 
angles and thus deconstruct each other, leading to significantly lower voltage THD at every bus. 
Figure 4.2 provides a comparison of bus voltage THD from both cases. 
This example clearly demonstrates the importance of capturing the interaction of 
harmonic sources over a wide area from a valid base case power flow solution. A realistic 
assessment of GMD impact will require the full model of an actual system with appropriate 
phase angle information. 
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Figure 4.1. ETAP diagram of IEEE 14 bus system 
 
 31 
 
Figure 4.2. Bus voltage THD in the IEEE 14 bus system under case 1 and case 2 
 
4.2.2 Modeling Methodology 
In this project, Dominion’s system is investigated though the use of a detailed 4,000 bus 
transmission model of the DVP grid that encompasses 24.6 GW of generation. The model is 
constructed specifically for this study in ETAP based on information taken from DVP’s 
MMWG-based bus-branch planning model and the more detailed protection model that includes 
full station topology, transformer winding configurations, and sequence network information. 
Combining information from these sources into a single cohesive whole proved to be the most 
demanding task of this project. This is not surprising as the sources of input data were each 
originally compiled for unique purposes with different levels of required detail and topology. 
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Generators are modeled using their negative sequence impedances. Negative sequence 
impedance equivalents are created at least one bus away from the boundary of Dominion’s 
system. Loads are modeled as impedances (see Model A in [52]) as opposed to more detailed 
induction motor models (e.g., Model C in [52]) to match ETAP functionality. Transmission lines, 
transformers, and reactors are modeled with frequency dependent impedances. Generator and 
load impedances are not frequency dependent in ETAP. Harmonic damping in the model is 
conservative as a result and somewhat understated compared to the actual system. 
4.2.3 Harmonic Current Injections 
In this model it is assumed that all three phases are balanced based on Dominion’s mean 
unbalance (defined as 
𝑉2
𝑉1
) of 0.3% and the project’s focus on the bulk electric system as a whole. 
In a balanced system, harmonic orders are related to specific sequence components such that the 
1st harmonic is positive sequence, the 2nd is negative sequence, and the 3rd is zero sequence. This 
pattern repeats ad infinitum. Symmetrical sequence network data must still be included in the 
model to capture the effects of all harmonics from GIC. 
Individual GIC harmonic injections can be set for each transformer using the magnetizing 
branch; this is a reasonable practice given Dominion’s transformer fleet. Doing so yields over 
200 injection points on Dominion’s EHV grid. Other sources of harmonics (e.g., loads) are 
considered negligible in comparison. Total harmonic distortion (THD) of all bus voltages and 
line currents in the system are then obtained after the harmonic load flow is solved. With 
multiple harmonic sources, analysis requires complex load flow instead of simple superposition 
so injection angles are as important as current magnitudes. Analysis is performed in the 
frequency domain (as opposed to using EMTP in the time domain) due to the scale of the model. 
4.2.4 GMD Scenario 
A 1-in-100 year GMD scenario is considered, leading to a geoelectric field magnitude of 
2 V/km. Both west-east and north-south incidence orientations are investigated. GMD input for 
this study is as described in [53] and [54]. Dr. Bernabeu’s calculations as originally presented in 
[55] are used for each transformer’s GIC magnitude input. The harmonic spectrum of the first  
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Figure 4.3. Harmonic current injection spectrum for particular transformer design [50] 
 
nine harmonics for a specific transformer in Dominion’s system is given in Figure 4.3 [50]. 
Phase angles for each injection align with the base load flow solution. 
4.3 Simulation Results 
Harmonic load flow analysis for a 1-in-100 year GMD scenario with a west-east field 
orientation yields voltage THD across buses of different voltage levels as shown in Figure 4.4 
[50]. (Due to an NDA with DVP, more detailed output tables are not provided to preserve a level 
of location anonymity.) The central line marks the median. The lower box edge falls at the 25th 
percentile, the upper edge at the 75th percentile. Whiskers extend to 2.7 standard deviations and 
extreme values are marked in red. 
As documented in [55], the largest GIC amplitudes are typically observed in substations 
located at the edges of the transmission system and substations with multiple transmission lines 
with abrupt changes in line orientation. Both statements hold true in this simulation. Figure 4.5 
shows the amplitude of GIC experienced during the 1-in-100 year GMD event simulated with  
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Figure 4.4. Voltage THD box plot across major bus voltage levels [50] 
 
blue representing harmonic current sources and red representing sinks [50]. Bus voltage THD 
does not conform to this pattern though. Under half-cycle saturation, the magnetizing current 
injects currents with large magnitudes at a wide range of harmonic frequencies. Lower order 
frequencies have the ability to propagate over significant electrical distances before being 
damped. Higher order frequencies are damped sooner as frequency-dependent impedance values 
increase with the harmonic order. Figure 4.6 shows the resulting voltage THD resulting from this 
simulation [50]. Clearly, bus voltage THD does not exhibit the same clustering as GIC 
injections, but spreads throughout the system. Since THD is a result of complex harmonic load 
flow with the over 200 injection sites working to boost or counteract one another, it cannot be 
assumed, as is done previous literature, that a few elements with equivalized boundary points 
will accurately represent a full system simulation. The assumption that buses with the largest 
GIC injections will experience the greatest voltage THD is clearly incorrect. 
The effects of the east-west orientation are generally worse in magnitude than the north-
south orientation scenario. Even so, the latter yielded similar results for locations of both GIC 
injections and THD across DVP’s system. 
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Figure 4.5. GIC injections for 1-in-100 year GMD event [50] 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Bus voltage THD for 1-in-100 year GMD event [50] 
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4.3.1 Model Validation 
The ideal validation for this study is an actual GMD event. Dominion has installed a 
system of monitoring devices known as GICnet across their grid in partnership with PJM 
Interconnection, LLC (PJM) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
GICnet measures power transformer neutral DC current, harmonic currents associated with 
transformer magnetizing currents, harmonic voltages and currents at capacitor banks, and 
transmission line DC currents. Unfortunately, (or fortunately, depending on the point of view,) 
while procedures are in place to validate harmonic load flow as data are acquired, DVP has not 
experienced a significant GMD event since GICnet was established. 
Without an accurate set of real world measurements or previous accepted research on 
wide-area GIC flow, transformer in-rush currents are chosen as a stand-in for validation 
purposes. Figure 4.7 shows THD measurements during in-rush events at several 500 kV and 
230 kV buses. These values are comparable to the simulation results presented in Figure 4.4.  
These two events are not strictly congruent. First, GMD will affect a wide area and create 
multiple harmonic sources; in-rush current causes only a single harmonic source. Second, 
depending on the closing angle and remnant core flux, transformer energization can fully offset 
core flux. The GIC current required to reproduce this effect is far beyond any expected value. 
E.g., the largest distortion in Figure 4.7, 11.3% THD, comes from a magnetizing current of 
approximately 1,200 ADC. The largest effective GIC predicted for a 1-in-100 year storm is 90 A 
per phase [55]. Still, given the similarity between the two phenomena [49], the comparison is 
useful to establish that the simulation results fall inside a reasonable range. 
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Figure 4.7. Voltage THD caused by monitored in-rush events 
 
4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed by switching capacitor banks out of service in several 
sequential sets. No resonant frequencies are excited by these topology changes, leading to the 
conclusion that these harmonic load flow results are valid for a range of operating points. 
Comparing the baseline THD to that found during this sensitivity analysis, the maximum 
increase is 0.13% while the maximum decrease is -1.7%. 
4.4 Conclusions 
NERC requires all system planning coordinators to assess potential GMD impact in their 
system and determine additional thermal loading that transformers may be required to sustain 
[56]. Harmonic load flow and THD has only a minor impact on this thermal loading though, as 
GMD-related heating is strongly tied to physical parameters of each transformer’s design and 
stray flux conditions. The results of the model created in this work are more useful in 
determining generator thermal loading and potential misoperation of protection and control 
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equipment across the system, both of which are highly sensitive to THD. Since several historic 
GMD events led to such misoperations, this function is equally important. 
From this study, Dominion found that 
 due to their current standard design of fuseless wye-grounded capacitor banks 
with voltage differential per phase primary protection and the high thermal 
capacity of all-film capacitors, the likelihood of capacitor bank failure under a 1-
in-100 GMD scenario is extremely low; 
 while possible, it is unlikely that STATCOM/SVC controllers would experience 
operation errors due to the maximum expected THD (6%); and that 
 DVP-owned generators should not experience nuisance tripping due to negative 
sequence current and generally be free from thermal overheating unless 
significant negative sequence current exists before the GMD event.  
DVP engineers did note that a discussion on the difference between negative sequence 
current due to faults vs. that due to loads may be in order with generator relay settings used 
across the utility industry reviewed as appropriate to avoid nuisance tripping. This analysis and 
Dominion’s full discussion of the findings were originally documented in [56]. 
The clear overarching finding is that GMD must be studies at the wide-area level. 
Reduced boundary conditions designed to target only a few elements such as a single generator 
connected to a step-up transformer cannot capture the complex interplay of harmonic current 
injections or the resulting voltage THD across the grid. Limiting studies to these conditions 
produces shortsighted results and, at best, will lead to suboptimal policy decisions. 
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: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF A HIGH ALTITUDE 
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE 
In 2015, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) along with CSRA Inc. and the 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) began a survey on the available methodologies to 
assess high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) impacts to power grids. The final goal of this 
project was to summarize accepted methodologies, critique critical findings as necessary, and 
suggest possible research directions. Differences in methodologies were found to lead to 
discrepancies in key results and the ultimate determination on whether a single high altitude 
EMP could lead to the collapse of the U.S. power grid. This author performed the HEMP E1 
power system impact simulations that are discussed in this chapter. 
5.1 Background 
Starfish Prime, a high-altitude nuclear test conducted by the U.S. government above 
Johnston Atoll on July 8, 1962, was the initial trigger event leading to research on HEMP 
impacts in electrical system, both military and civilian. The detonation created a peak electric 
field of 5.6 kV/m [57] over Honolulu on the island of Oahu, 800 miles from the test site. This 
peak amplitude is relatively small compared to targeted HEMP scenarios, but it is still enough 
when paired with the orientation of street light wiring on the island to cause a coherent buildup 
of surges that resulted in the failure of 30 strings of streetlights. Over time, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Bell Labs developed unclassified models that represent what they consider 
the most damaging features of HEMP without fully describing the phenomena [58]. These 
models are referred to as bounding waveforms since they contain only the most basic 
information about magnitude and timescale. While these models are useful for basic research, 
hardening the electric grid against attacks requires more detailed information. With the recent 
push for development on that front by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [59]-
[61], it is necessary to demonstrate the need for—and specific requirements of—more complete 
models. 
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5.1.1 HEMP Components 
HEMP can be divided into three transient components: early-time E1, intermediate-time 
E2, and late-time E3 [59], [62]. In addition to acting on different timescales, the magnitude of 
each component is significantly distinct. Figure 5.1 presents an illustrative plot of a HEMP signal 
divided into constituent components. 
E1 electric field magnitude caused by the initial gamma burst is strong, but usually 
decays within half a microsecond. As such, E1 is a steep-front, short-duration (SFSD) pulse 
waveform with a duration measured in nanoseconds. It is possible for a large majority of the 
48 contiguous states to experience E1 with an amplitude in the order of tens of kilovolts per 
meter from a single HEMP burst. Due to the strength of the field, E1 is the component 
traditionally studied when assessing nuclear EMP effects [59]. 
After the SFSD pulse passes, the intermediate-time E2 component caused by scattered—
or “delayed”—gamma pulses is observed. The peak E2 electric field magnitude is notably  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Illustrative qualitative example of transient HEMP components on a log-log graph 
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weaker at several hundred volts per meter and exhibits less time variance. The E2 component 
typically lasts several hundred microseconds. 
The final late-time E3 component, also known as magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) EMP, 
follows. E3 resembles a short, intense natural geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) since it results 
from geomagnetic perturbations caused by the initial HEMP event. The peak E3 electric field is 
usually on the order of tens of volts per kilometer and the component duration is measured in 
hundreds of seconds. 
5.1.2 HEMP Models 
Determining the potential effects of HEMP on a power grid requires detailed 
specifications of the E1, E2, and E3 electric field components. As shown in Chapter 4, system 
reduction can significantly influence simulation results. In contrast, the original HEMP model 
developed by Bell Labs contains only generic worst-case E1 components [62]. In order to 
obscure or remove waveform detail to prevent users from ascertaining confidential data 
regarding the delivery system, spatial considerations outside the altitude of the detonation are 
ignored and only ground-zero is considered when calculating the waveform envelope. 
The Compton High Altitude Pulse (CHAP), a more advanced HEMP model, was 
designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and validated at ORNL to incorporate the 
other two time components as well as crescent- and circle-shaped impact zones [62], [63]. Maps 
of these zones are typically referred to as “smile diagrams” due to the visual aesthetic of seeing 
crescent outlines inside larger circles. CHAP offers a more complete picture, but obtaining useful 
component waveforms requires a thorough understanding of the gamma pulse input parameters 
and the ability to form reasonable assumptions surrounding them. This is a barrier to many 
researchers in the field and even more so for electric utilities attempting to understand potential 
HEMP affects. 
In an attempt to address this issue, Metatech further developed CHAP to provide more 
complete E1 data [59]. This Metatech model is currently the one used by ORNL and FERC for 
electric grid oriented HEMP studies [59]-[61]. As a tradeoff to keep the model unclassified, 
almost all input values from the original CHAP code are hidden in the Metatech implementation. 
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Figure 5.2. Map of HEMP detonation and impact locations 
 
5.2 HEMP E1 Impact Study 
This study is designed to simulate loss and recovery of load after a HEMP detonation 
over the northern states using information available from unclassified models. The assumptions 
used are consistent with assuming only E1; E3 may cause a wider area loss of load due to total 
harmonic distortion. Specifically, it is postulated that a HEMP detonation will occur as shown in 
Figure 5.2 with impacted load areas in the Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO), 
ReliabilityFirst (RF), and Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) reliability council 
regions.  
5.2.1 Input Event Assumptions 
Impacted areas are selected based on the results of previous ORNL HEMP studies 
[59], [64]-[66] showing that HEMP will create two crescent-shape areas (highlighted in yellow 
in Figure 5.2) to the east and west of the detonation on the edge of the area under bombardment. 
 
 
 43 
The detonation site is selected so that the two areas are on a circle approximately covering the 
major load centers (within the white circles) of the reliability/coordinating regions of interest. 
In the 2003 blackout, initial load loss was limited. Grid collapse was caused by over-
reaching protection relays and a failure of operators to assess the danger of the situation as 
quickly as it developed. Unclassified models do not provide the information necessary to 
determine the amount of load that will be lost as a result of E1, but due to coupling analysis there 
is a high probability it will be located in the highlighted tangential regions. This region has the 
highest probability of flashover on distribution networks [65]-[67]. 
The impact map is based upon knowledge of general “smile diagram” characteristics but 
is not an actual “smile diagram” simulation. It is representative of a relatively low burst that 
provides an effected area with about a 1000 km diameter. The worst case for coupling occurs at 
low angles of incidence and near end-on orientation of the coupled line to the burst point. An 
extensive discussion of this topic is available in [59], [64]-[67]. 
This study examines the frequency and voltage impact of losing load equivalent to a 
given percentage of the total MRO and RF demand and, after a delay, a recovery of 75% of the 
lost load. The objective is to estimate the minimum load drop that leads to a system collapse. 
Under the direction of HEMP experts at ORNL, three load loss percentages, 5%, 10%, and 15%, 
and two recovery periods, four seconds and 10 seconds, are considered. A conservative 
assumption is made that generators are shielded well enough that there will be no generation loss 
throughout the system. Simulation results including loss of load within the NPCC region are 
discussed separately. 
5.2.2 Modeling Methodology 
The base case is a 16,000 bus PSS®E model of the Eastern Interconnection (EI) derived 
from the Eastern Interconnection Reliability Assessment Group (ERAG) Multiregional Modeling 
Working Group (MMWG) model. The model includes complete dynamic data information and 
realistic dead-band governor response validated using FNET/GridEye measurements [68]. In 
order to drop and reconnect load in appropriate quantities, additional dummy load buses are 
created at appropriate locations across the Northeast and the original loads are scaled to preserve 
the correct aggregate sum at every location. A total of 2,432, 3,363, and 4,002 new nodes are 
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added to the 5%, 10%, and 15% load loss cases, respectively. A breakdown of the original, 
dropped, and recovered load by region is shown in Table 5.1.  
Note that as each individual load is broken into component pieces in order to facilitate the 
75% recovery the system power flow is resolved. This multi-step solution avoids large numerical 
jumps that can lead to convergence problems when using Newton-Raphson-based algorithms. If 
the new solution state is only sought after the thousands of dummy buses are added, the amount 
of load that is shifted is too great for PSS®E to resolve even though they are connected to the 
original buses by zero-impedance branches. 
Six dynamic scenarios are simulated to account for all combinations of the three 
percentage load loss values and two recovery delays. All six scenarios extend to a total 
simulation time of 30 seconds. (Load loss occurs at t = 1 second; recover at t = 5 seconds for the 
4 second delay and t = 11 seconds for the 10 second delay.) Frequency and voltage are recorded 
at all base case buses with a voltage rating between 500 kV and 765 kV throughout the EI. 
System protection is not modeled in the base case so the effects of over- and under-frequency, 
current, or voltage relays are not contemplated. 
5.2.3 Simulation Results 
The resulting frequency deviation and voltage profiles for the six HEMP E1 impact 
scenarios are presented in Figure 5.3 through Figure 5.14. While the first five simulations show 
no convergence errors, the solution in the final scenario (15% load loss with 75% recovery after  
 
Table 5.1. Megawatt summaries for the original, dropped, and recovered load by region 
MW Totals 5% Case 10% Case 15% Case 
All EI 
Original 578,207 578,207 578,207 
Dropped 12,602 25,188 37,797 
Recovered 9,451 18,891 28,347 
MRO 
Original 53,585 53,585 53,585 
Dropped 2,679 5,369 8038 
Recovered 2,679 4,027 6,028 
RF 
Original 19,8176 19,8176 198,176 
Dropped 9,922 19,819 29,758 
Recovered 7,442 14,864 22,319 
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10 seconds) ceases to converge at t = 7.7198 seconds. This may indicate numerical instability in 
the PSS®E model, but appears to stem from small signal or voltage instability within the system 
itself and possibly portends a threat such as cascading faults. Reducing the dynamic simulation 
time step has no noticeable impact on this result (other than moving the decimal point to match 
the new step size). 
Maximum and minimum frequency values and the largest voltage dip for each scenario 
are shown in Table 5.2. Note that all three metrics increasingly deviate from their respective 
nominal values as the scenario definitions become more extreme. The minimum frequency and 
minimum voltage values would almost certainly trigger local protection relays. Whether this 
would arrest the spread of cascading blackouts or lead to them through systematic load shedding 
cannot be ascertained from the data available from the original MMWG model. 
5.2.4 NPCC Participation 
Several attempts are made to include the NPCC region circled in Figure 5.2 in the 
simulated scenarios. Every attempt to drop loads or buses in the region immediately results in 
non-convergent solutions. While underlying issues such as insufficient VAR support cannot be 
completely ruled out, it is worth noting that when all loads across the NPCC are universally 
lightened in the initial state power flow analysis but no elements are dropped during dynamic 
simulation, no convergence errors are reported. The NPCC control areas are represented by 
sparse matrices in the original model and all indicators point to numerical issues within the 
solution algorithm caused by further thinning the node connection matrix instead of problems 
truly present in the physical system.  
 
Table 5.2. Maximum and minimum measurements by scenario 
Load Loss 
Percentage 
Recovery 
Time (seconds) 
Maximum 
Frequency 
Minimum 
Frequency 
Minimum 
Voltage 
5% 4 sec 60.2598 Hz 60.0000 Hz 0.9615 pu 
5% 10 sec 60.2720 Hz 59.9369 Hz 0.9546 pu 
10% 4 sec 60.5156 Hz 59.9009 Hz 0.8880 pu 
10% 10 sec 60.5156 Hz 59.7983 Hz 0.8596 pu 
15% 4 sec 60.8189 Hz 59.5921 Hz 0.7256 pu 
15% 10 sec -- -- -- 
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Figure 5.3. Frequency deviation for 5% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 4 seconds 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Voltage profile for 5% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 4 seconds 
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Figure 5.5. Frequency deviation for 5% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 10 seconds 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Voltage profile for 5% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 10 seconds 
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Figure 5.7. Frequency deviation for 10% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 4 seconds 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Voltage profile for 10% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 4 seconds 
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Figure 5.9. Frequency deviation for 10% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 10 seconds 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Voltage profile for 10% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 10 seconds 
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Figure 5.11. Frequency deviation for 15% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 4 seconds 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Voltage profile for 15% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 4 seconds 
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Figure 5.13. Frequency deviation for 15% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 10 seconds 
Solution ceases to converge at t = 7.7198 seconds 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Voltage profile for 10% load loss with 75% recovery at t = 10 seconds 
Solution ceases to converge at t = 7.7198 seconds 
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5.3 Conclusions and Future Work 
This range of results shows the need for further advances in unclassified HEMP models 
before the electric grid can be truly hardened against attacks. Flashover in distribution systems 
caused by HEMP E1 will mainly occur on the eastern and western edges of HEMP impact areas, 
but the ability of the grid to deal with load loss cannot be assessed without more detailed input 
information. From the results in Table 5.2, the input data ORNL can currently provide allows for 
anything from a non-event to a catastrophic wide-area blackout. Due to their sequential nature, 
the further effects of E2 and E3 HEMP components cannot be contemplated without dependable 
E1 simulations. Researchers at ORNL continue to work toward producing the required 
unclassified comprehensive HEMP models while protecting sensitive data. This study serves to 
fuel that conversation. 
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: STRATEGIC TRANSFORMER RESERVE 
INTERCONNECTION-WIDE GRID SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
In December of 2015, Congress passed the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation 
(FAST) Act. Sec. 61004 of the act contains a mandate for a Strategic Transformer Reserve plan 
that must address 
 
the number and type of large power transformers necessary to provide or restore 
sufficient resiliency to the bulk-power system, critical electric infrastructure, and 
defense and military installations to mitigate significant impacts to the electric 
grid resulting from— 
(i) physical attack; 
(ii) cyber attack; 
(iii) electromagnetic pulse attack; 
(iv) geomagnetic disturbances; 
(v) severe weather; or 
(vi) seismic events [69] 
 
The Secretary of Energy was to consult FERC and other stakeholders before presenting 
the Strategic Transformer Reserve plan to Congress. The U.S. Department of Energy contracted 
Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) to provide 
technical analysis of the issues at hand. 
6.1 Problem Formulation 
If a critical set of large power transformers (LPTs) exists whose unavailability could lead 
to a cascading power failure, then the Strategic Transformer Reserve plan should anticipate their 
loss. Most scenarios the plan must address occur within a radial geographic footprint. As the 
Metcalf substation attack demonstrated though, targeted strikes on individual transformers are 
not out of the question [70]. Also, as address in Chapter 4, it is possible for GMD or other natural 
phenomena to affect large areas, or even the entire country, simultaneously. As such, the 
criticality of power transformers in the bulk electric system (BES) must be assessed using an 
event agnostic method. To this end, the U.S. electric system is examined for crucial large power 
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(+100 MVA) transformers at transmission-level substations and the impact each has on the rest 
of the system when removed from service, both individually and in targeted sets. 
This chapter deals specifically with the methodology and results of simulations 
performed to determine the criticality of large power transformers as originally performed by this 
author—mainly for the WECC interconnection, but with some EI and European analysis 
included for the sake of comparison. Two distinct ranking methods are presented. The first 
details a ranking system based on thermal line loading constraints. The second covers a ranking 
system based on available reactive power (VAR) support. The practical application of each of 
these systems is also discussed. 
The contracted team’s full technical analysis for the Strategic Transformer Reserve 
includes results for all three major U.S. grids using the same process along with discussion on 
existing mitigation systems and the recommended number, design, and placement of 
transformers for the proposed reserve. The final technical report is published in [71]. 
6.2 Methodology 
The ultimate purpose of the BES is to serve electrical load. At first glance, it would 
appear that the simplest methodology for determining the criticality of any element is to remove 
that element from service and record the resulting load loss. This method is quickly discarded 
when dealing with a real system though. In a healthy interconnection, the loss of any single 
element should not lead to the loss of load (that is not radially connected to that element) or to 
operational limit violations (defined in terms of thermal line loading and bus voltage bands). 
This is known as N-1 stability. All U.S. interconnections are required to meet N-1 criteria or face 
penalties imposed by the North Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) [72].  
As such, there should be no transformer, or any other single element, which can cause a 
large-scale blackout by its loss alone. A set of transformers is necessary. With the number of 
extra-high voltage substations, simulating the loss of transformers throughout the interconnection 
requires a defined workflow. In the WECC system there are over 90 substations on the 500 kV 
system. Combinatorial math quickly surpasses billions of possible scenarios. (Simply using (
𝑛
7
) 
yields over one billion unique possibilities.) In light of this, it is necessary to start by ranking the 
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criticality of each substation and transformer relative to the others. Combinatorial event 
scenarios are then informed by this ranking. 
A python script is created to identify and remove all large power (500 kV connected) 
transformers by substation. Helper functions written for this script that may be useful in other 
scripting situations are available in Appendix C. The script to identify substation bus lists, 
defined as all buses connected by zero-impedance branches (bus ties) or transformers, is 
presented in Appendix D. The resulting power flow solutions are recorded for analysis after 
problematic cases are addressed manually. The two traditional steady state diagnostics, bus 
voltage levels and transmission line power flows (which are practical translations of equipment 
thermal limits), are chosen to guide ranking metrics. Due to the mostly decoupled nature of real 
and reactive power flow, each metric leads to a different methodology. Line flow/thermal limits 
are represented by incremental thermal transfer capacity analysis. Bus voltage stress is quantified 
using reactive power generation headroom. 
6.2.1 Incremental Thermal Transfer Capacity 
While examining the loss of load due to the loss of each transformer is overly simplistic 
and ultimately unworkable, the idea can be extended into a useful methodology. Instead of 
simply using the current operating point, a calculation of the additional load that can be 
supported by the system under a given topology and generation commitment is a natural metric 
for determining system stress and existing reliability margin. To estimate the load capacity of the 
system due to thermal limitations, an incremental load calculation is performed using DC 
linearized power flow analysis. The AC power flow base case solution for the system must be 
established prior to conducting this analysis. 
DC linearization relies on the widely used approximation that for most circuits 𝑋𝑖𝑗 ≫ 𝑅𝑖𝑗 
and the angle between two connected buses is small.  These assumptions simplify the power flow 
from bus i to bus j to 
 Pij =
θi−θj
Xij
 (6.1) 
where 
𝜃𝑖 is the voltage phase angle at bus i; 
𝜃𝑗  is the voltage phase angle at bus j; and 
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𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the reactance between bus i and bus j. 
and the power injection at a given bus in an N bus system is given by 
 𝑃𝑖 = ∑
𝜃𝑖−𝜃𝑗
𝑋𝑖𝑗
N
𝑖𝑗    (6.2) 
or for the full system 
 𝑷 = 𝑩𝜽 (6.3) 
where 𝑩 is the sparse admittance matrix of the system. 
For small changes from a known nonlinear AC solution, ignoring reactive power and bus 
voltage in this way produces only negligible solution error [73]. 
 The distribution factor technique expands DC linearization to find the limiting solution 
of a base case. Sensitivity analysis of the elements under review provides the basis for linear 
projection [74]. This is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Applied to this problem, this technique is used to perform the equivalent of a generic N-1 
study where each single element connected at a designated voltage level or above is removed in 
turn. All load across the system, excluding buses with connected generators, is scaled up  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Linear projection technique 
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uniformly. (Note that generator buses are excluded since topology is not a factor in the amount 
of load that may be served directly at the generator terminals.) This additional load is 
compensated for by uniformly scaling generation across the system in proportion to the available 
capacity margin, also referred to as headroom, of each unit. Thermal branch ratings, expressed in 
terms of MVA flow, are assessed after each scaling solution step. The minimum additional load 
that leads to any transmission line or transformer surpassing its rated MVA limit is recorded as 
the incremental load capability of the system. 
To rank the criticality of LPTs in relation to one another, the incremental load calculation 
is repeated over a set of scenarios where each individual scenario covers the loss of a single LPT. 
This can be extended to the scenarios for the loss of LPTs at entire substations in the WECC 
system or even more complex multi-contingency scenarios, as necessary. Each scenario 
(representing the impact of losing that given LPT, substation, etc.) is then ranked relative to the 
entire set with lower or more negative incremental load capability values representing more 
critical operating states and thus, more critical scenarios. 
PSS®E Implementation 
Performing this analysis in PSS®E relies on two main functions: DFAX and TLTG. 
DFAX, the distribution factor file setup activity, reads subsystem definitions, 
contingency sets, and monitored elements lists into a single file as preparation for AC 
contingency analysis or several other available study activities [75]. 
 In preparation for this incremental transfer capacity analysis, at least two subsystems 
should be created: 
 A subsystem containing all buses with generation 
 A subsystem containing all buses with load but not generation 
These subsystems are used to conduct load and generation scaling steps. 
Contingency sets can be defined to automatically include each single branch elements 
(transmission lines and two-winding transformers) using a third subsystem definition. A more 
complex definition set may be used if desired. 
The monitored elements should include all branches (transmission lines and two-winding 
transformers) with a rated voltage matching the network fed by the low side of the LPTs under 
test. Note that as radial connections, generator step-up units (GSUs) should not be considered 
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when choosing this voltage level. As with the contingency descriptions, monitored element data 
can be input using individual entries or defined more simply using an additional voltage-based 
subsystem. 
When assessing the criticality of LPTs in a given system, the subsystem, contingency, 
and monitored element files created for the base case will apply to all scenarios under study as 
well. 
TLTG, the transmission transfer limit analysis activity, offers a distribution factor 
technique based on DC linearized network theory for MVA flow (thermal) sensitivity 
analysis [76]. 
The distribution factor file created using DFAX and several study parameters (which 
typically can be left as their default values) must be passed to the engine to run the activity. The 
result is a text report that lists the increased transfer capability of the generation and load 
subsystems (as defined in DFAX) along with the most limiting element and contingency for that 
value. TLTG accepts only a single case for analysis and so must be repeated for each scenario. 
Python Implementation 
Repeatedly running and recording TLTG activity reports through the PSS®E graphic 
user interface (GUI) is typically not the most efficient use of an engineer or researcher’s time. A 
simple Python function can optimize this process through the application of the Siemens psspy 
module, which comes packaged with all new installations of PSS®E. 
 
def create_tltg_report(sub, con, mon, report): 
    dfx = 'temp.dfx' 
    psspy.dfax([1,1], sub, con, mon, dfx) 
    psspy.report_output(2, report, [2, 0]) 
    psspy.tltg([_i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i,  
                _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i], [_f, _f, _f, _f,  
                _f, _f, _f], [Sys1, Sys2, _s, _s, _s, _s,  
                _s, _s], dfx) 
    psspy.close_report() 
    psspy.report_output(1, _s, [_i, _i]) 
    return 
 
where  
sub, mon, and con are, respectively, the paths for the substation, monitored elements, 
and contingency definition files;  
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report is the path at which results are saved; and 
_i, _f, and _s are the PSS®E default integer, real, and string values, respectively. 
Limitations of this Methodology 
There are three limitations of this method that must be addressed. The first is the reliance 
on the presence of accurate thermal limitations within the base case. If data for thermal limits are 
not available or those provided are not correct, then the results of this methodology will be 
inherently flawed. This problem is avoided by ensuring that the base case is an accepted 
benchmark model. 
The second is oversensitivity to the transfer capacity of low importance elements. 
Engineering judgement is required when interpreting the transmission transfer limit reports. If 
the most limiting element is a small radial line serving little to no load, it may be appropriate to 
choose the transfer capability value of the next most limiting entry instead when ranking that 
scenario. 
The third limitation is that this incremental transfer thermal capacity methodology only 
considers real power flow constraints. Tallying bus voltage or VAR support constraints requires 
a separate analysis. 
6.2.2 Reactive Power Generation Headroom 
The effects of real power imbalance are felt throughout an interconnection—a fact 
leveraged to great effect in automatic generation control (AGC) systems. In contrast, reactive 
power flow, and thus voltage issues, is localized by nature. As a result, no single element can be 
monitored to provide a metric of system stress from a voltage perspective. Instead of focusing on 
a single worst-case element, the interconnection must be taken into account. 
This can be accomplished by measuring reactive power generation headroom, or VAR 
capacity still available for commitment from each unit, across the system. For a system with M 
units, this can be expressed as 
 𝑄𝐻𝑅 = ∑ 𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑎𝑥
M
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑄𝑖,𝑔𝑒𝑛
M
𝑖=1  (6.4) 
or 
 𝑄𝐻𝑅 = ∑ 𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑄𝑖,𝑔𝑒𝑛
M
𝑖=1  (6.5) 
where 
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𝑄𝐻𝑅 is the total reactive power headroom of the system; 
𝑄𝑖,𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum reactive limit of unit i; and 
𝑄𝑖,𝑔𝑒𝑛 is the current reactive power generation of unit i. 
While each generation unit is only capable of providing local support, the total headroom 
available across the entire system is a decent metric for overall voltage conditions. Scenarios can 
be ranked with smaller headroom values representing conditions that are more critical. 
PSS®E Implementation 
The generation set point of each unit in a PSS®E case can be seen from the GUI. The 
same view provides the maximum MVAR available from each unit. The headroom can either be 
manually tallied by the user or, as recommended for larger systems, automatically polled using 
the built-in PSS®E activity AMACHREAL [77]. This activity must be called twice; once to 
obtain the current reactive power generation of each unit and once to obtain the maximum 
reactive power generation of each unit. The total system headroom can then be calculated 
using (6.4). 
Python Implementation 
Calculating the reactive power generation headroom for a single case is a simple process. 
Repeating the calculation for the loss of every single LPT becomes tedious. As with the previous 
methodology, this process can be optimized with the functionality provided by the psspy Python 
module. The following function implements (6.4) to return the headroom for the current case. 
 
def get_Q_headroom(): 
    ierr, (QGen,) = psspy.amachreal(-1, 1, 'QGEN') 
    ierr, (QMax,) = psspy.amachreal(-1, 1, 'QMAX') 
    totalQGen = sum(QGen) 
    totalQMax = sum(QMax) 
    QHeadroom = totalQMax - totalQGen 
    return QHeadroom 
  
Limitations of this Methodology 
This methodology has two main limitations. First, while the potential exists for real 
power flow to effect the results of this methodology, it is largely decoupled from reactive power 
flow and bus voltages (leading to the DC linearization assumptions discussed previously). 
Therefore, neither the incremental transfer capacity metric or the reactive power generation 
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headroom calculation can provide a single criticality assessment method for LPTs. Both are 
necessary to fully understand the system. 
The second limitation is that a highly localized voltage collapse may potentially go 
unnoticed by this metric. If voltage is depressed in an electrically remote section of the system, 
overall reactive power headroom may not appreciably respond. Engineering judgement is 
required to assess voltage levels of the system and ensure that no such significant voltage 
depression exists. 
6.2.3 Application of Ranking Methodology 
In the author’s experience, applying either methodology presented here to a benchmarked 
system model and plotting the resulting ordered criticality index results in a “knee” curve. An 
illustrative curve for the incremental thermal transfer capacity method is shown in Figure 6.2. 
One for the reactive power generation headroom method is shown in Figure 6.3. Due to the 
sensitive nature of this analysis, actual values from the WECC analysis are not used and both 
graphs are normalized with no specific identifiers given. 
Several things can be seen from these graphs. The first and most obvious is that in each 
the LPTs can be clustered by relative criticality. The most critical lie before the first knee point. 
Using the thermal-based incremental transfer capability ranking there are then two distinct 
groupings of LPTs with similar criticality ranks. Looking at the available VAR support 
headroom in this case produces a more gradual transition, but the results can still be classified by 
the section of the curve they fall under. 
The next statement that can be made from these graphs is that the two ranking systems 
will not yield identical results. What cannot be directly seen is that any given LPT’s score under 
one ranking system may or may not be similar to that same element’s score under the other. Due 
to the decoupled nature of the methodologies, this should be expected. Determining the 
criticality of LPTs requires investigating their impact under both methodologies. An LPT that 
significantly impacts the system under either scheme must be considered crucial. 
Flowing from that, the plotted information yields relative rankings. While it may be 
feasible to study only those LPTs with the highest criticality measurement in further analysis,   
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Figure 6.2. Illustrative ordered criticality index plot using thermal ranking 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Illustrative ordered criticality index plot using VAR support ranking 
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elements within the lower ranking clusters may also be important enough that they must be 
considered. This decision requires engineering judgement based on the results of the power flow 
scenarios. These methodologies do provide direction for such decisions though, and provide 
quantitative data to facilitate them. 
Individual LPTs vs. Full Substation Scenarios 
Note that the application of this methodology for the transformer reserve technical review 
in [71] uses scenarios (and thus rankings) based on full substations instead of individual LPTs. 
Almost any event that could materially harm an LPT so as to remove it from service would most 
likely effect the entire substation. Scenarios seeking to quantify immediate repercussions of such 
an event should remove most, if not all, elements at that substation from service. The transformer 
reserve analysis investigated the long-term effects of LPT loss. Since lines and buses are 
comparatively simple to rebuild, only LPTs were removed from service at substations chosen for 
each scenario. This reflects the long lead time required to manufacture, transport, and connect an 
LPT. 
The resulting rankings are therefore given for each substation instead of each individual 
LPT in the system. The horizontal axes in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 are labeled according to the 
same convention for consistency. Curves for individual LPT criticality rankings would possess 
similar knee shapes. 
6.2.4 Combinatorial Scenarios 
In relation to the WECC system specifically, it is possible to isolate a subset of crucial 
transformers with 500 kV primary connections for combinatorial studies. Combinatorial 
scenarios are constructed based on the sequential loss of all transformers in crucially ranked 
substations. Modifying the original Python script used to create individual substation scenarios, 
applying the helper functions found in Appendix C, and adding logic to handle cases that were 
previously addressed by hand allows these runs to be automated as well so that outages build 
from highest ranked impact to lowest rank impact until PSS®E reaches a divergent solution. 
Power flow results for the new system state are recorded after the LPTs at each individual 
substation are dropped. 
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Table 6.1. Illustrative results from an example combinatorial outage scenario  
Sequence 
Iteration 
Substation 
Dropped 
Solution 
Thermal 
Max (p.u.) 
Voltage 
Max (p.u.) 
Voltage 
Min (p.u.) 
1 Station A Converged 0.9634 1.0831 1.020 
2 Station B Converged 0.9634 1.0874 1.021 
3 Station C Converged 1.0232 1.0852 1.008 
4 Station D Converged 1.0239 1.0863 0.9989 
5 Station E Not Converged 1.0117 1.0993 1.003 
5' Station E Converged (Manually) 1.0117 1.0992 1.003 
6 Station F Diverged 1.0119 1.747 0.456 
 
 
Data for an example simulation set are given in Table 6.1. The specifics of how to 
interpret these data are discussed below. (Note that due to the project NDA, this data is not from 
the actual WECC model used for this study. Table 6.1 is provided for illustrative purposes only.) 
Long-term Emergency Operation Limits 
Typically, utilities would determine if an operating state is feasible by referencing 
predefined bus voltage and thermal line loading limits. These are almost always defined under 
two categories: normal operation and emergency operation. Normal operation limits cover the 
restrictions placed upon equipment loading for extended periods in order to maintain the life of 
each element in the system. Emergency operation limits are higher ratings allowable for short 
durations (ranging from 15 minutes to four hours, depending on the specific utility). The system 
cannot operate under emergency rating level states for an extended time without impacting the 
lifetime performance of stressed elements. 
The scenarios envisioned by the FAST Act can certainly be described as emergencies, but 
the extended lead time required to manufacture, transport, and connect new LPTs for a substation 
may cover days, weeks, or even months. Given this, short-term emergency ratings are not 
appropriate metrics to measure system performance against. While counterintuitive at face value, 
normal ratings are applied since this analysis aims to investigate the long-term status of the post-
event system. In consultation with system planners and operators from several utilities, the 
following criteria are selected to define limit violations: 
 Branch thermal constraints (normal operation thermal limits) cannot be met 
without shedding load; or 
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 Bus voltages are outside acceptable limits of 95% to 105% of their nominal 
ratings—or 100% to 110% for 500 kV buses (which are usually run higher on a 
per unit scale than buses of lower voltage levels). 
While in some cases violations only represent a 0.001% deviation beyond these limits, no 
extra tolerance is considered permissible. This increases confidence in the analysis integrity by 
removing subjective judgement calls.  
Dealing with Non-convergent Power Flow States 
During both individual and combinational substation scenarios, certain runs result in 
PSS®E reporting a non-convergent or divergent state. Manual oversight is required for these 
since it is possible that the solution engine has overlooked a convergent solution. The process to 
determine and resolve issues depends on which state the simulation has reached. 
A non-convergent solution state is one where total system error is still relatively low, but 
no convergent solution can be found. If a system is in a non-convergent state after several 
iterations (40+), there is probably an oscillating control element at play. 
The worst offenders are discrete step switched shunt capacitor banks with voltage steps 
too large for the solver error tolerance. Inside each pair of iterations, the same switched shunt 
will shift back and forth between the two values, seeking to reach a settling point between the 
two available steps. In reality, system operators seek to minimize capacitor switching of any kind 
and automated systems have time constants that prohibit rapid switching. Locking the offending 
shunt almost always fixes the issue and allows the case to converge within three or four 
iterations. While the solution may not be optimal in the strictest sense of the word, any additional 
losses are usually negligible and the converged state is valid. A similar, although less common, 
issue may occur with transformer taps settings; the resolution method is identical. 
A divergent solution state (referred to within PSS®E as a case that has “blown up”) 
typically requires more involvement. In the context of the Strategic Transformer Reserve 
analysis, almost all divergent solutions are caused by areas of load that become mostly isolated 
or electrically distant from reactive power sources after the loss of the scenario’s LPTs. 
Effectively, this creates pseudo-islands without significant voltage support. Many of these cases 
can still be resolved by returning to the last converged solution state and removing the pseudo-
island from service. After the LPTs are removed and a valid equilibrium is reached, the pseudo-
 66 
island is then brought back into services a few buses at a time. This allows the solver to 
gradually adjust to the new topology instead of shocking the system with the new reactive power 
flow pattern all at once. The final solution is valid, the iterative mathematics underlying the 
Newton-Raphson power flow equations just need a little more help than the actual system. 
It is possible for a situation to arise where not every connected load can be served without 
causing voltage collapse. When this occurs, the minimum level of load possible to resolve the 
issue is removed from service. The megawatt total of the lost load should be recorded and 
factored into scenario cruciality assessment.  
This process is illustrated in Figure 6.4 through Figure 6.10 using a simple one line 
diagram. First, the LPTs at the top of the diagram are removed from service (Figure 6.5). This 
separates the load center from the strong source. Even though another source is available, the 
result is a divergent solution state due to voltage collapse (Figure 6.6). 
After resetting with the base case, removing the entire load center form service (Figure 
6.7) and bringing the buses back online in stages (Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9) allows the solver to 
calculate an alternate reactive power flow using the remaining path to the system. This yields a 
valid solution even when only the LPTs of interest remain the only elements out of service 
(Figure 6.10). 
Interpreting Combinatorial Scenarios 
The results of the example combinatorial run in Table 6.1 (page 64) show that the 
cumulative loss of the first four stations (Station A through Station D) results in a convergent 
solution. Losing the fifth station (Station E) as well requires manual intervention to reach a 
convergent solution. The additional loss of the sixth station (Station F) results in a divergent 
solution. It is possible that a solution exists for this last step, but both the thermal and voltage 
measurements in previous iterations show readings outside acceptable limits, so the effort 
required to reach a convergent state is unwarranted.  
Note that by definition, divergent solutions contain unacceptably high numerical error. 
Thus, thermal and voltage values from divergent states are not valid and cannot be used to make 
this determination.  
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Greater System
Greater System
 
Figure 6.4. Example system one line diagram 
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Greater System
Greater System
 
Figure 6.5. LPTs at top removed from service 
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Greater System
Greater System
 
Figure 6.6. Local voltage collapse leads to a divergent solution state 
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Greater System
Greater System
 
Figure 6.7. Alternative solution process: Begin by removing entire load center from service 
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Greater System
Greater System
 
Figure 6.8. Then bring sections back into service in stages 
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Greater System
Greater System
 
Figure 6.9. This allows the numeric solver to calculate more feasible VAR flow patterns  
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Greater System
Greater System
 
Figure 6.10. The final result is a valid system with only the LPTs under test removed from service 
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In this case though, at least one branch element exceeded 100% of its thermal rating with 
the loss of Station C and at least one bus voltage dropped below the 1.0 p.u. rating threshold 
(assume 500 kV buses) with the subsequent loss of Station D. As the first iteration with 
unacceptable limit violations, iteration three (loss of Station A through Station C) requires 
further attention and all successive iterations must be reevaluated. 
Under the procedure used for the WECC Strategic Transformer Reserve study, spare 
transformers should be substituted into the system one at a time until the converged system 
shows no unacceptable limit violations. Substitution begins with the most critically ranked 
station (Station A in this example) and works to the least critically ranked (Station C in iteration 
three). If two transformers are in parallel, as in Figure 6.10, usually only one must be restored to 
service through the use of a spare transformer in order to gain the benefit of the station. The 
relative benefit of adding a second spare at either that same substation or the next substation 
under the criticality ranking is usually heavily weighted toward the latter option. 
An example of the sequential process using transformer replacement to alleviate limit 
violations is presented in Table 6.2. An event that causes the loss of all transformers in Station A 
through Station F requires four replacement transformers to keep the system within the 
operational limits defined for this study. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Illustrative results from an example combinatorial outage scenario with transformer replacement 
Sequence 
Iteration 
Substation 
Dropped 
Solution 
Method 
Limit Violations 
Cumulative 
Replacements 
1 Station A Automated None 0 
2 Station B Automated None 0 
3 Station C Automated Thermal 0 
3' Station C Replacement (1) None 1 
4 Station D Automated Voltage 1 
4' Station D Replacement (1) None 2 
5 Station D Automated Not Converged 2 
5' Station E Manual None 2 
6 Station F Automated Diverged 2 
6' Station F Manual Thermal & Voltage 2 
6'' Station F Replacement (2) None 4 
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Localized Event Scenarios 
This same process can be applied to determine the impact of geographically defined 
events, e.g., earthquakes or hurricanes. Once the footprint of the scenario is defined, substations 
inside that geographical boundary are determined. These are used as the sequential substations be 
removed instead of those with the most critical ranking in the interconnection. As replacement 
transformers are required, their placement should still be directed to substations with higher 
criticality ranking. 
6.2.5 Spare Transformer Identification 
After the number of required spare transformers is determined, the number of existing 
spare transformers must be known in order to identify any shortfall that the Strategic 
Transformer Reserve should meet. Spare transformers stored on-site at the substation under 
study are considered to also be lost, and cannot count toward system restoration. Since most 
transformers that perfectly match operational units are stored in the same switchyard, finding 
appropriately designed spares became an important point of study. 
ORNL surveyed utilities across the nation to obtain an understanding of existing space 
transformer practices and the size of replacement caches. Survey responses show a high number 
of spare transformers. The total is discounted though since many utilities share pools of mobile 
replacement units (and each member utility would report the pool, leading to counting each 
transformer multiple times). The total is further limited due to the problem statement requiring 
spares to be located off-site. 
Conversely, the complete pool of potential spares grows significantly when existing 
operational units are considered. While transformers at substations with high criticality rankings 
should not be removed, a single transformer from a parallel set inside a substation with a low 
ranking can usually be taken out of service and relocated without significant impact to the 
original location. Reliability margin is decreased, but under the envisioned scenarios, this 
decrease is negligible. 
Suitable substitution is defined as a donor (replacement) transformer with: 
 Identical rated voltage on the primary and secondary connections; 
 An MVA rating greater than the original unit’s operational MVA loading; and 
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 A reactance between 100% and 120% of the original unit’s reactance. 
These requirements were submitted to a panel of experienced industry leaders before 
their adoption [71].  
A Python script was written to locate suitable replacement transformers, considering both 
two winding and three winding units, for any given PSS®E subsystem. This script is presented 
in Appendix E. The results of this scripted analysis and the utility surveys provided a complete 
picture of potential spare and donor transformers for the Strategic Transformer Reserve technical 
analysis team to consider. 
6.3 Substation Pair Analysis 
To validate this ranking methodology, analysis is conducted using the 9,241 bus pan-
European (EU) fictitious data-set publically distributed with installations of MATPOWER 
(case9241pegase.m) [78], [79]. Python scripts are used to conduct a full ranking for the loss of 
all transformers by each substation. The analysis is then rerun with every possible combination 
of substation pairs is then removed. Due to the large number of simulations involved, divergent 
cases are not manually resolved as described in Chapter 6.2.4, but instead ranked as most crucial. 
6.3.1 European Analysis Results 
The script presented in Appendix D is used to group buses connected by zero-impedance 
branches (bus ties) and transformers into substations sets. In total, the EU case contains 81 such 
substations with bus voltage levels of at least 400 kV. High voltage (also defined here as at least 
400 kV on the primary winding) transformers associated with each of the 81 substations sets are 
removed in turn, creating 81 initial scenarios for analysis. Incremental thermal transfer capacity 
and VAR generation headroom rankings for these scenarios are shown in Figure 6.11 and Figure 
6.12, respectively. The single data point in each marked with a red diamond represents a 
divergent system solution. The specific metric values shown for this point are not necessarily 
valid, but chosen to mark the most critical ranking while preserving a sense of scale in the plots. 
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Figure 6.11. Ordered thermal criticality index ranking for high voltage EU substations 
 
 
Figure 6.12. Ordered VAR support criticality index ranking high voltage EU substations 
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Table 6.3. Summary of EU paired substation scenario convergence 
Interconnection Summary EU 
Number of Substations 81 
Maximum Substation Voltage 750 kV 
Minimum Substation Voltage 400 kV 
Total Substation Pairs 3240 100.00% 
Converged Scenarios 3157 97.44% 
Blown Up Scenarios 83 2.56% 
 
 
With 81 substations, there are 3,240 possible pairs to consider.  (There are 85,320 
possible triads, which cleanly illustrates why a ranking methodology is important to pare down 
scenarios for the Strategic Transformer Reserve analysis.) Summary results for scenario 
convergence are presented in Table 6.3. Out of the 83 divergent solutions, 79 contain a single 
substation—the one found most critical in the individual substation rankings using both metrics. 
To further the comparison with the individual rankings, thermal and VAR support indices 
are calculated for each scenario. Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14 each contain a series of box plots 
created from the thermal and VAR support results, respectively. Each box plot contains the 
results of all pairs including an individual substation, ordered using the given individual 
substations’ rankings. Thus, in Figure 6.13 the first box plot is created from the thermal metric 
results of all 80 substation pair scenarios that include the substation with the worst individual 
thermal metric ranking. The second box plot is created from the thermal metric results of all 
80 substation pair scenarios that include the substation with the second worst individual ranking. 
This continues for all 81 substations. Figure 6.14 follows the same design, but uses the VAR 
support metric to both create and order the box plots. 
For each box, the red central line marks the median, the lower edge falls at the 25th 
percentile, the upper edge at the 75th percentile, whiskers extend to 2.7 standard deviations, and 
extreme values are marked with red crosshairs. For either metric, following the median points 
across each substation box plot series results in a curve shape similar to what is seen in the 
appropriate individual substation criticality plot (either Figure 6.11 or Figure 6.12). This 
provides validation for the use of both metrics in ranking individual substations in order to 
design combinatorial scenarios. 
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Figure 6.13. Thermal analysis box plots for paired high voltage EU substations ordered by single substation rank 
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Figure 6.14. VAR support analysis box plots for paired high voltage EU substations ordered by single substation rank 
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Table 6.4. Summary of WECC and EI paired substation scenario convergence 
Interconnection Summary WECC EI 
Number of Substations 292 361 
Maximum Substation Voltage 500 kV 765 kV 
Minimum Substation Voltage 345 kV 500 kV 
Total Substation Pairs 42486 100.00% 64980 100.00% 
Converged Scenarios 38791 91.30% 51069 78.59% 
Unconverged Scenarios 528 1.24% 1365 2.10% 
Blown Up Scenarios 3167 7.45% 12546 19.31% 
 
 
6.3.2 Comparison with Other Systems 
Paired substation analysis is also conducted for the WECC and EI systems. In WECC, 
substations from 345 kV and up are considered. The cutoff voltage for the EI is set at 500 kV. 
Even with full Python automation, over a fortnight of simulation runtime was required. Including 
voltage levels down to 345 kV in the EI would have more than doubled this. A summary of 
scenario convergence information is provided in Table 6.4. 
As with the previous analysis, scenarios that do not converge may not represent dispatch 
and demand patterns with no true physical solution, but system states that are difficult for the 
numeric solver to shift between given the specific optimization algorithm used. Unfortunately, 
the sheer number of scenarios prohibits manual investigation into each case per the methodology 
laid out in Chapter 6.2.4. 
The higher percentage of unconverged and blown up cases in the U.S. analysis is fed by 
the overall complexity of the benchmarked U.S. models compared to the publically available EU 
case. This is evident both in the system as a whole, e.g., significant swathes of the EU system are 
aggregated for the model while the U.S. cases are fairly detailed, and from examining individual 
substation composition, e.g., there are no three winding transformers and few parallel 
transformers in the EU case, both are common in the U.S. cases. Blown up scenarios do not 
correlate with distance (geographic or electric) between affected substation pairs. Instead, as with 
the EU case, a short list of critical substations accounts for almost the entirety of these cases in 
both systems. 
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The WECC and EU analysis both return network transformers as the majority of critical 
points. Critical units in the EI are split almost evenly between network transformers and GSUs. 
This is like a reflection of network topology. The EI is heavily meshed and the loss of any given 
unit does not require major power flow shifts as a result. In contrast, the EU has fewer major 
high voltage connections and a ring around the western states with a line through the middle can 
approximate the WECC high voltage system. The loss of any intertie in these systems causes a 
more dramatic power flow shift and carries a greater risk to system reliability. 
6.4 Further Combinatorial Studies 
Under the scope of the FAST Act technical analysis, additional sequential studies are 
created based on proximity to fourteen locations, chosen for either their status as metropolitan 
centers or grid connection points. In each case, a focal point is chosen and LPTs are dropped 
from each substation in order from closest to furthest until the power flow solution diverges. 
While divergence of the load flow solution is not a perfect measure of true system issues, it does 
serve as a decent metric of developing problems. It is possible for the loss of LPTs at a single 
substation to lead to a divergent solution but with the methodology detailed in Chapter 6.2.4, it is 
possible to manually lead the algorithm to viable convergent solution states. 
Figure 6.15 through Figure 6.28 present maps for each case. A red circle designates the 
final impact radius as measured from the central focal point for each case (marked with 
crosshairs) where the case ceases to converge. 500 kV substations are represented with green 
dots, 345 kV substations with blue dots. The loss of all LPTs within the circle is sustainable. The 
additional loss of LPTs at the substation (singular in all cases) located on the circle is not. Note 
that water features are plotted using low-resolution shape files, so boundary lines are not fully 
precise. 
Results for all cases are summarized in Error! Reference source not found.. With s
urvivable impact zones ranging from 13 to 200 miles containing anywhere from two to 19 
individual high voltage substations, the data clearly show that no single scale or event may be 
utilized to assess the entire interconnection. 
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Figure 6.15. Map of Case A impact zone 
 
 
Figure 6.16. Map of Case B impact zone 
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Figure 6.17. Map of Case C impact zone 
 
 
Figure 6.18. Map of Case D impact zone 
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Figure 6.19. Map of Case E impact zone 
 
 
Figure 6.20. Map of Case F impact zone 
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Figure 6.21. Map of Case G impact zone 
 
 
Figure 6.22. Map of Case H impact zone 
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Figure 6.23. Map of Case I impact zone 
 
 
Figure 6.24. Map of Case J impact zone 
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Figure 6.25. Map of Case K impact zone 
 
 
Figure 6.26. Map of Case L impact zone 
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Figure 6.27. Map of Case M impact zone 
 
 
Figure 6.28. Map of Case N impact zone 
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Table 6.5. Proximity-based impact study results 
Case 
Final Radius 
(miles) 
Substations Impacted 
Total 500 kV 345 kV 
Case A 13.7 2 0 2 
Case B 14.7 4 0 4 
Case C 17.1 3 0 3 
Case D 22.6 6 5 1 
Case E 27.6 6 4 2 
Case F 28.4 8 8 0 
Case G 29.7 3 3 0 
Case H 31.9 9 6 3 
Case I 51.2 4 4 0 
Case J 54.4 4 4 0 
Case K 95.1 8 8 0 
Case L 136.8 4 4 0 
Case M 162.0 19 0 19 
Case N 194.4 8 3 5 
 
 
6.5 Findings and Conclusions 
The methodology presented here for ranking crucial substations and designing sequential 
or geography-based scenarios revealed a finite number of crucial substations that require spare 
transformers in the event of an interconnection-wide catastrophic event. The vast majority of 
transformers do not qualify as crucial. Only a small fraction—less than 10% of the total in-
service fleet—receive this designation. More than 90% of these crucial transformers can be 
matched with donor transformers from other substation if necessary. Additional replacement 
options are provided by existing centrally located spare pools. Furthermore, utilities continue to 
improve spare transformer inventory and substation defenses as directed by NERC CIP-014 [80]. 
The metrics defined here are useful for broader power system resiliency analysis covering 
any set of elements. While both metrics must be compared to a baseline specific to the system in 
question as opposed to a universal constant, the analysis for individual elements accurately 
predicts worst-case combinatorial scenarios. 
Further discussion of the findings relating to the technical analysis performed in response 
to the FAST Act along with analysis of topics handled by team members other than this author 
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such as reserve location planning and transportation logistics are discussed in the final technical 
report to the DOE [71]. 
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: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Advancements in technology and computing have opened up areas of inquiry that were 
not previously accessible. Wide-area analysis can now be conducted for power system topics 
previously studied in highly equivalized models. This work covered two such topics. 
The first was the changes in the dynamic response of the Eastern Interconnection as coal-
fired plants retire. As stalwart synchronous generation with large inertia constants, the loss of 
traditional coal carries the potential to weaken the grid. Replacing these units with natural gas, 
per federal filings in 2012 anticipating the 2017 grid does show this effect, but at a slight enough 
difference to be considered as a non-issue. 
Replacing traditional synchronous generation with non-synchronous sources, e.g., solar 
photovoltaics and wind turbines, is a different story. The loss of generator controls inherent to 
present day renewable installations exacerbates dynamic response degradation. As renewable 
sources replace coal units, inertia should be added to the system, either organically or artificially, 
to account for retiring synchronous generators. Stability standards should also require renewable 
units to provide control actions as the share of system demand they meet increases. Losing 
turbine governor and voltage exciter controls causes just as significant an impact as the loss of 
system inertia. 
The second topic was the methodology required to assess high-impact events with the 
potential to effect an entire interconnection. The need for such methodology was clearly 
demonstrated with the development of the GMD model for DVP’s transmission network. The 
results of that analysis clearly show that the traditional equivalisation of systems down to a 
single generator, step-up transformer, and infinite bus (representing the rest of the system) 
cannot accurately capture the interaction of harmonic currents injected due to transformer 
saturation across a large area. Assessing the impact of solar flares and other geomagnetic events 
requires wide-area models and analysis. In Virginia, given a hundred year solar storm, the bus 
voltage THD across the system is high enough to notice, but low enough not to be a major 
concern. 
The need to advance existing techniques was then shown, specifically when discussing 
HEMP E1. At this time, un-classified HEMP models do not provide a complete enough picture 
to determine what the result of a given detonation will be. Even knowing the area of effect, 
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potential impacts from distribution flashover can range from a small loss of load to wide-area 
cascading failures. 
Finally, an event agnostic methodology for interconnection-wide security assessments 
was developed. Two metrics were presented, the first reliant on real power concerns, the second 
on voltage support capability. Together these allow criticality ranking of any individual or 
combinations of elements in a system, providing a framework for identifying lapses in backup 
equipment. The process for this is presented in generic form, but was conducted specifically for 
large power transformers per the mandate of the FAST Act. These metrics function as a measure 
of system resiliency against any given event. Result patterns are consistent in both industry 
benchmarked EI and WECC model as well as the EU case provided by MATPOWER. 
7.1 Future Work 
Further investigation into dynamic response implications of transitioning from traditional 
synchronous generators to non-synchronous renewable sources requires wind turbine and solar 
photovoltaic models that do not introduce numerical instability into dynamic power system 
solvers. This is a known issue for PSS®E simulations of high-density renewable scenarios. A 
solution to this problem would allow for greater simulation fidelity. 
Dominion’s service territory is located further south than most solar flares reach. 
Repeating the wide-area analysis methodology used to assess Virginia with a system in New 
England or Canada may produce interesting results and discussion. 
As ORNL refined HEMP models, electric power grid impact analysis should be revised. 
Further detail on the waveform produced by the initial detonation and the inclusion of system 
protection in grid simulations are both desirable. 
The two security assessment metrics, incremental transfer capability and VAR generation 
headroom, act as measures of system resiliency. The methodology presented here can be 
extended to elements beyond large power transformers as well as more complex event scenarios. 
The scripting tools created during this project may be further developed to this end. 
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APPENDIX A: FUEL TRANSITION SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Figure A.1. Base case frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
 
 
Figure A.2. Year 2012 frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
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Figure A.3. Year 2013 frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
 
 
Figure A.4. Year 2014 frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
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Figure A.5. Year 2015 frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
 
 
Figure A.6. Year 2016 frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
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Figure A.7. Year 2017 frequency response for 2003 MW east coast generation loss 
 
 
Figure A.8. Base case frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
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Figure A.9. Year 2012 frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
 
 
Figure A.10. Year 2013 frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
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Figure A.11. Year 2014 frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
 
 
Figure A.12. Year 2015 frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
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Figure A.13. Year 2016 frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
 
 
Figure A.14. Year 2017 frequency response for 5~ southeast bolted bus fault 
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Figure A.15. Base case frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
 
 
Figure A.16. Year 2012 frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
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Figure A.17. Year 2013 frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
 
 
Figure A.18. Year 2014 frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
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Figure A.19. Year 2015 frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
 
 
Figure A.20. Year 2016 frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
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Figure A.21. Year 2017 frequency response for southwest 230 kV line trip 
 
 
Figure A.22. Base case frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
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Figure A.23. Year 2012 frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
 
 
Figure A.24. Year 2012 frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
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Figure A.25. Year 2014 frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
 
 
Figure A.26. Year 2015 frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
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Figure A.27. Year 2016 frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
 
 
Figure A.28. Year 2017 frequency response for 800 MW southeast load shed 
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APPENDIX B: LOSS OF INERTIA SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Figure B.1. Event 1, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.2. Event 1, Case 1: Voltage response 
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Figure B.3. Event 1, Case 2: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.4. Event 1, Case 2: Voltage response 
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Figure B.5. Event 2, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.6. Event 2, Case 1: Voltage response 
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Figure B.7. Event 2, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.8. Event 2, Case 2: Voltage response 
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Figure B.9. Event 3, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.10. Event 3, Case 1: Voltage response 
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Figure B.11. Event 3, Case 2: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.12. Event 3, Case 2: Voltage response 
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Figure B.13. Event 4, One Unit, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.14. Event 4, One Unit, Case 1: Voltage response 
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Figure B.15. Event 4, Two Units, Case 1: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.16. Event 4, Two Units, Case 1: Voltage response 
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Figure B.17. Event 4, One Unit, Case 2: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.18. Event 4, One Unit, Case 2: Voltage response 
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Figure B.19. Event 4, Two Units, Case 2: Frequency response 
 
 
Figure B.20. Event 4, Two Units, Case 2: Voltage response 
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APPENDIX C: PYTHON HELPER FUNCTIONS CREATED FOR PSS®E 
#!/usr/bin/env/python 
"""Provides functionality for PSS®E simulation. 
 
This functionality is not readily available from the official Python 
API. 
 
Requires Python 2.7 and PSS®E 33  
    -or- Python 2.5 and PSS®E 32 
""" 
 
import csv, os, re, shutil, sys 
from sets import Set 
from time import strftime 
from random import randint 
 
# Import PSS®E APIs 
psse_version = 33 
pssbin_path = 'C:\\Program Files 
(x86)\\PTI\\PSSE{0}\\PSSBIN'.format(psse_version) 
sys.path.append(pssbin_path) 
os.environ['PATH'] = (pssbin_path + ';' + os.environ['PATH']) 
import psspy, redirect, dyntools 
 
# Obtain PSS®E defaults 
_i = psspy.getdefaultint() 
_f = psspy.getdefaultreal() 
_s = psspy.getdefaultchar() 
redirect.psse2py() 
 
__author__ = 'Micah J. Till' 
__copyright__ = 'Copyright 2017' 
__version__ = "2.1.1" 
 
def use_best_var_type(str): 
    try: 
        test_float = float(str) 
        test_int = int(test_float) 
        if test_float == test_int: 
            return test_int 
        else: 
            return test_float 
    except ValueError: 
        return str 
 
def load_case(path): 
    if path.endswith('.sav'): 
        ierr = psspy.case(path) 
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    elif path.endswith('.raw'): 
        ierr = psspy.read(0, path) 
    else: 
        ierr = -1 
    return ierr 
         
def get_temp_sid(value_if_none = None): 
    for sid in range(0, 12): 
        if not psspy.bsysisdef(sid): 
            psspy.bsysdef(sid, 1) 
            return sid 
    return value_if_none 
 
def kill_temp_sid(sid): 
    psspy.bsysdef(sid, 0) 
    return 0 
 
def fdns_solution(opts): 
    good_run = False 
    ierr = psspy.fdns(opts) 
    ival = psspy.solved() 
    if (ierr == 0) and (ival == 0): 
        good_run = True 
    return (good_run, ierr, ival) 
 
def fnsl_solution(opts): 
    good_run = False 
    ierr = psspy.fnsl(opts) 
    ival = psspy.solved() 
    if (ierr == 0) and (ival == 0): 
        good_run = True 
    return (good_run, ierr, ival) 
 
def solve_case(): 
    SLTN_OPTIONS = [1,0,0,1,1,0,99,0] 
    caseStatus = fdns_solution(SLTN_OPTIONS) 
    return caseStatus 
 
def solve_with_discrete_locked(): 
    SLTN_OPTIONS = [1,0,0,1,2,0,99,0] 
    caseStatus = fdns_solution(SLTN_OPTIONS) 
    return caseStatus 
 
def solve_with_discrete_fully_locked(): 
    SLTN_OPTIONS = [2,0,0,1,2,0,20,0] 
    caseStatus = fdns_solution(SLTN_OPTIONS) 
    return caseStatus 
 
def solve_on_lockdown(): 
    SLTN_OPTIONS = [0,0,0,1,2,0,20,0] 
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    caseStatus = fdns_solution(SLTN_OPTIONS) 
    return caseStatus 
 
def get_bus_elements_by_bsys(bsys_id): 
    ierr, (bs0,) = psspy.abusint(bsys_id,2,'NUMBER') 
    ierr, (bs1,) = psspy.abusint(bsys_id,2,'AREA') 
    ierr, (bs2,) = psspy.abusreal(bsys_id,2,'PU') 
    ierr, (bs3,) = psspy.abusreal(bsys_id,2,'ANGLED') 
    ierr, (bs4,) = psspy.abusreal(bsys_id,2,'BASE') 
    ierr, (bs5,) = psspy.abusint(bsys_id,2,'TYPE') 
    if bs0 is not None: 
        bus_elements = zip(bs0,bs1,bs2,bs3,bs4,bs5) 
    else: 
        bus_elements = () 
    return bus_elements; 
 
def get_branch_elements_by_bsys(bsys_id): 
    TIES = 1 
    ierr, (br0,) = psspy.abrnint(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'FROMNUMBER') 
    ierr, (br1,) = psspy.abrnint(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'TONUMBER') 
    ierr, (br2,) = psspy.abrnchar(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'ID') 
    ierr, (br3,) = psspy.abrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'MVA') 
    ierr, (br4,) = psspy.abrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'RATEA') 
    ierr, (br5,) = psspy.abrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'RATEB') 
    ierr, (br6,) = psspy.abrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'RATEC') 
    ierr, (br7,) = psspy.abrnint(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'STATUS') 
    if br0 is not None: 
        branch_elements = zip(br0,br1,br2,br3,br4,br5,br6,br7) 
    else: 
        branch_elements = () 
    return branch_elements; 
 
def get_two_winding_elements_by_bsys(bsys_id): 
    TIES = 3 
    ierr, (xd0,) = psspy.atrnint(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'FROMNUMBER') 
    ierr, (xd1,) = psspy.atrnint(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'TONUMBER') 
    ierr, (xd2,) = psspy.atrnchar(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'ID') 
    ierr, (xd3,) = psspy.atrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'MVA') 
    ierr, (xd4,) = psspy.atrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'RATEA') 
    ierr, (xd5,) = psspy.atrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'RATEB') 
    ierr, (xd6,) = psspy.atrnreal(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'RATEC') 
    ierr, (xd7,) = psspy.atrnint(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,1,'STATUS') 
    if xd0 is not None: 
        two_winding_elements = zip(xd0,xd1,xd2,xd3,xd4,xd5,xd6,xd7) 
    else: 
        two_winding_elements = () 
    return two_winding_elements; 
 
def get_three_winding_elements_by_bsys(bsys_id): 
    TIES = 3 
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    ierr, (yd0,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,_i,'WIND1NUMBER') 
    ierr, (yd1,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,_i,'WIND2NUMBER') 
    ierr, (yd2,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,_i,'WIND3NUMBER') 
    ierr, (yd3,) = psspy.atr3char(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,_i,'ID') 
    ierr, (yd4,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys_id,_i,TIES,2,_i,'STATUS') 
    if yd0 is not None: 
        three_winding_elements = zip(yd0,yd1,yd2,yd3,yd4) 
    else: 
        three_winding_elements = () 
    return three_winding_elements; 
 
def record_and_remove_islands(): 
    ierr, (busesBeforeIsland,) = psspy.abusint(-1,1,'NUMBER') 
    ierr, genBeforeIsland = psspy.systot('GEN') 
    ierr, loadBeforeIsland = psspy.systot('LOAD') 
    ierr = psspy.island() 
    ierr, (busesAfterIsland,) = psspy.abusint(-1,1,'NUMBER') 
    ierr, genAfterIsland = psspy.systot('GEN') 
    ierr, loadAfterIsland = psspy.systot('LOAD') 
    islandBuses = list(set(busesBeforeIsland)-set(busesAfterIsland)) 
    islandGen = genBeforeIsland - genAfterIsland 
    islandLoad = loadBeforeIsland - loadAfterIsland 
    return (islandBuses,islandGen,islandLoad); 
 
def record_and_reset_islands(): 
    tempdir = os.getcwd() 
    temprnd = randint(1000,9999) 
    tempfile = 
'temp{0}_{1}.sav'.format(strftime('%Y%m%d%H%M%S'),temprnd) 
    tempfullpath = '{0}//{1}'.format(tempdir,tempfile) 
    ierr = psspy.save(tempfullpath) 
    ierr, (busesBeforeIsland,) = psspy.abusint(-1,1,'NUMBER') 
    ierr, genBeforeIsland = psspy.systot('GEN') 
    ierr, loadBeforeIsland = psspy.systot('LOAD') 
    ierr1 = psspy.island() 
    ierr2, (busesAfterIsland,) = psspy.abusint(-1,1,'NUMBER') 
    ierr3, genAfterIsland = psspy.systot('GEN') 
    ierr4, loadAfterIsland = psspy.systot('LOAD') 
    islandBuses = list(set(busesBeforeIsland)-set(busesAfterIsland)) 
    islandGen = genBeforeIsland - genAfterIsland 
    islandLoad = loadBeforeIsland - loadAfterIsland 
    ierr = psspy.case(tempfullpath) 
    os.remove(tempfullpath) 
    return (islandBuses,islandGen,islandLoad); 
 
def last_switched_shunts(progressOutput): 
    REGEX_GROUP_SHUNTS = r'''SWITCHED SHUNTS ADJUSTED:[\r|\n|\r\n]X---
----- AT BUS ---------X[ |\t]*OLD Q[ |\t]*NEW 
Q[\r|\n|\r\n](?: \d+ \[.*[\r|\n|\r\n])+[\r|\n|\r\n]\d+ 
switched shunt[s]? adjusted''' 
 130 
    REGEX_INDIVIDUAL_SHUNTS = r'''(?: (\d+) \[.*[\r|\n|\r\n])''' 
 
    iFile = open(progressOutput, 'r') 
    logFile = iFile.read() 
    iFile.close() 
 
    groupPattern = re.compile(REGEX_GROUP_SHUNTS, re.MULTILINE) 
    individualPattern = re.compile(REGEX_INDIVIDUAL_SHUNTS, 
re.MULTILINE) 
 
    shuntGroupSwitched = None 
    for shuntGroupSwitched in re.finditer(groupPattern, logFile): 
        pass 
    lastShuntsSwitched = re.findall(individualPattern, 
shuntGroupSwitched.group(0)) 
    lastShuntsSwitched = map(int, lastShuntsSwitched) 
     
    return lastShuntsSwitched 
 
def lock_switched_shunt(bus): 
    ierr = psspy.switched_shunt_chng_3(bus, [_i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, 
_i, _i, _i, _i, _i, 0], [_f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f, 
_f, _f, _f, _f], _s) 
    return ierr 
 
def drop_switched_shunt(bus): 
    ierr = psspy.switched_shunt_chng_3(bus, [_i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, 
_i, _i, _i, _i, 0, _i], [_f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f, 
_f, _f, _f, _f], _s) 
    return ierr 
 
def create_tltg_report(sub, con, mon, report): 
    tempdir = os.getcwd() 
    temprnd = randint(1000,9999) 
    tempfile = 'temp{0}_{1}.dfx'.format(strftime('%Y%m%d%H%M%S' ), 
temprnd) 
    dfx = '{0}//{1}'.format(tempdir,tempfile) 
    Sys1 = 'ALLGEN' 
    Sys2 = 'ALLLOAD' 
    ierr = psspy.dfax([1,1], sub, mon, con, dfx) 
    psspy.report_output(2, report, [2, 0]) 
    ierr = psspy.tltg([_i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, _i, 
_i, _i, _i, _i, _i], [_f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f, _f], [Sys1, 
Sys2, _s, _s, _s, _s, _s, _s], dfx) 
    psspy.close_report() 
    psspy.report_output(1, _s, [_i, _i]) 
    os.remove(dfx) 
    return 0 
 
def parse_tltg_limiting_element_report(tltgPath): 
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    # This still breaks on some report rows; I don't know why 
    REGEX_LIMITING_ELEMENTS = (r'''[ ]*(?:(<?[-0-9.]+)[* \t]+''' 
                               '''(\d+(?:WNDTR)?)[ \t]+(?:([-_. #&a-
zA-z0-9]{1,12})[ \t]*([0-9.]+|WND \d+))[ \t]+''' 
                               '''(\d+(?:WNDTR)?)[ \t]+(?:([-_. #&a-
zA-z0-9]{1,12})[ \t]*([0-9.]+|WND \d+)|(PHSHFT [-_. #&a-zA-
z0-9]{1,12}[0-9.]+))[ \t]+''' 
                               '''([&a-zA-Z0-9]{1,2})[ \t]+''' 
                               '''([-.\d]+)[ \t]+([-.\d]+)[ \t]+([-
.\d]+)''' 
                               '''[ \t]+(?:-*\n[ \t]+)?(OPEN|BASE 
CASE)[ ]?([^\r\n]*)(?:\r\x0c\.*)?\n)''')               
 
    REGEX_LIM_EL_HEADER = (r'''(?:[ \t]+INCR\.[ \t]+PRE-[ 
\t]+RATING\n''' 
                           '''[ \t]+TRANS \<-* LIMITING ELEMENT -*\>[ 
\t]+DISTR\.[ \t]+SHIFT BAS/CNT\n''' 
                           '''[ \t]+CAPAB \<-* F R O M -*\> \<-* T O -
*\>CKT[ \t]+FACTOR[ \t]+MW[ \t]+A/[AB]{1}[ \t]+\<-* 
CONTINGENCY DESCRIPTION -*\>\n)''' 
                           '''(''' + REGEX_LIMITING_ELEMENTS + 
''')+''') 
 
    iFile = open(tltgPath, 'r') 
    logFile = iFile.read() 
    iFile.close() 
     
    groupPattern = re.compile(REGEX_LIM_EL_HEADER, re.MULTILINE) 
    individualPattern = re.compile(REGEX_LIMITING_ELEMENTS, 
re.MULTILINE) 
     
    allElementsReported = [] 
    for elementReportPage in re.finditer(groupPattern, logFile): 
        
allElementsReported.extend(re.findall(individualPattern,ele
mentReportPage.group(0))) 
        pass 
    return allElementsReported 
 
def limiting_transfer_capability_contingency(tltgPath): 
    INCLUDE_THREE_WINDINGS = True 
    KEEP_UNDER_NEGATIVE_99999 = False 
 
    mostLimitingElement = [] 
    foundWorst = False 
    tltgEl = parse_tltg_limiting_element_report(tltgPath) 
    for el in tltgEl: 
        if not foundWorst: 
            if INCLUDE_THREE_WINDINGS or (el[4] != '3WNDTR'): 
                if KEEP_UNDER_NEGATIVE_99999 and (el[0] == '<-99999'): 
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                    el = [-100000] + list(el[1:]) 
                if (el[0] != '<-99999'): 
                    mostLimitingElement = list(el) 
                    for idx, x in enumerate(mostLimitingElement): 
                        mostLimitingElement[idx] = 
use_best_var_type(x) 
                    foundWorst = True 
    return mostLimitingElement 
 
def get_Q_headroom(): 
    ierr, (QGen,) = psspy.amachreal(-1, 1, 'QGEN') 
    ierr, (QMax,) = psspy.amachreal(-1, 1, 'QMAX') 
    totalQGen = sum(QGen) 
    totalQMax = sum(QMax) 
    QHeadroom = totalQMax - totalQGen 
    return QHeadroom 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
    pass 
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APPENDIX D: SUBSTATION BUS LIST SCRIPT 
#!/usr/bin/env/python 
"""Builds substation list for a PSS®E case. 
 
This script contains several functions, many 
of which can be used individually, but which 
build to substation_lists_to_csv(path). This 
functions will parse the pre-loaded PSS®E 
case and create a CSV file at the given path 
with one row per substation. (Defined as 
buses connected by transformers or zero-imp 
branch equivalents.) 
 
Requires Python 2.7 and PSS®E 33  
    -or- Python 2.5 and PSS®E 32 
""" 
 
import sys, os, csv 
 
# Import PSS®E APIs 
PSSE_VERSION = 33 
PSSBIN_PATH = 'C:\\Program Files 
(x86)\\PTI\\PSSE{0}\\PSSBIN'.format(PSSE_VERSION) 
sys.path.append(PSSBIN_PATH) 
os.environ['PATH'] = (PSSBIN_PATH + ';' + os.environ['PATH']) 
import psspy, redirect, dyntools 
 
# Obtain PSS®E defaults 
_i = psspy.getdefaultint() 
_f = psspy.getdefaultreal() 
_s = psspy.getdefaultchar() 
redirect.psse2py() 
 
__author__ = 'Micah J. Till' 
__copyright__ = 'Copyright 2017' 
__version__ = "1.2.0" 
 
def combine_lists(new, old = []): 
    y = old[:] 
    for x in new: 
        if x not in y: 
            y.append(x) 
    return y 
 
def get_temp_sid(value_if_none = None): 
    for sid in range(0, 12): 
        if not psspy.bsysisdef(sid): 
            psspy.bsysdef(sid, 1) 
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            return sid 
    return value_if_none 
 
def kill_temp_sid(sid): 
    psspy.bsysdef(sid, 0) 
    return 0 
 
def is_dummy_bus(ibus): 
    x = False 
    if psspy.busint(ibus, 'DUMMY')[1]: 
        x = True 
    return x 
 
def is_zero_imp(Z): 
    ZERO_DEF = [0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0000] 
    fake_branch = False 
    if abs(Z.real) <= ZERO_DEF[0] and abs(Z.imag) <= ZERO_DEF[1]: 
        fake_branch = True 
    return fake_branch 
 
def find_zero_branch_ends(ibus): 
    sid = get_temp_sid(11) 
    jbus = [ibus] 
    ierr = psspy.bsys(sid, 
                      0, [0, 0],            # kV 
                      0 ,[],                # Areas 
                      ibus, [ibus],         # Buses 
                      0, [],                # Owners 
                      0, [])                # Zones 
     
    ierr, (bus1,) = psspy.abrnint(sid, _i, 3, 2, 1, 'FROMNUMBER') 
    ierr, (bus2,) = psspy.abrnint(sid, _i, 3, 2, 1, 'TONUMBER') 
    ierr, (brID,) = psspy.abrnchar(sid, _i, 3, 2, 1, 'ID') 
    kill_temp_sid(sid) 
     
    for i,br in enumerate(brID): 
        ierr, brZ = psspy.brndt2(bus1[i], bus2[i], br, 'RX') 
        if is_zero_imp(brZ): 
            jbus += [bus1[i], bus2[i]] 
     
    jbus = [j for j in jbus if j != ibus] 
    jbus = combine_lists(jbus) 
    jbus.sort() 
    return jbus 
 
def find_tx_ends(ibus): 
    sid = get_temp_sid(11) 
    jbus = [ibus] 
    ierr = psspy.bsys(sid, 
                      0, [0, 0],            # kV 
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                      0 ,[],                # Areas 
                      ibus, [ibus],         # Buses 
                      0, [],                # Owners 
                      0, [])                # Zones 
     
    ierr, (jbus2,) = psspy.atrnint(sid, _i, 3, 2, 2, 'TONUMBER') 
    jbus = combine_lists(jbus2, jbus) 
     
    for idx in (1,2,3): 
        ierr, (jbus3,) = psspy.atr3int(sid, _i, 3, 2, _i, 
'WIND{0}NUMBER'.format(idx))         
        jbus = combine_lists(jbus3, jbus) 
    kill_temp_sid(sid) 
     
    jbus = [j for j in jbus if j != ibus] 
    jbus = combine_lists(jbus) 
    jbus.sort() 
    return jbus 
 
def substation_list_from_bus(ibus, substationBusList = []): 
    sbuses = combine_lists([ibus], substationBusList) 
    jbus = find_zero_branch_ends(ibus) 
    jbus += find_tx_ends(ibus) 
    for bus in jbus: 
        if bus not in sbuses: 
            sbuses.append(bus) 
            sbuses = substation_list_from_bus(bus, sbuses) 
    return sbuses 
 
def substation_lists_to_csv(csvPath): 
    TRACK_PROGRESS = False                  # Displaying progress 
significantly slows this process 
    INCLUDE_DUMMY_BUSES = False             # Set to False to exclude 
dummy buses 
 
    sid = get_temp_sid(11) 
    ierr = psspy.bsys(sid, 
                      1, [0.0, 9999],       # kV 
                      0 ,[],                # Areas 
                      0, [],                # Buses 
                      0, [],                # Owners 
                      0, [])                # Zones 
     
    ierr, (allBuses,) = psspy.abusint(sid, 2, 'NUMBER') 
    kill_temp_sid(sid) 
 
    with open(csvPath, 'wb') as f: 
        writer = csv.writer(f) 
        writer.writerow(['Name', 'Bus List']) 
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    checkedBuses = [] 
    for i,ibus in enumerate(allBuses): 
        if ibus not in checkedBuses: 
            if INCLUDE_DUMMY_BUSES or not is_dummy_bus(ibus): 
     
                if TRACK_PROGRESS: 
                    print 'Bus: {0} ({1:.2f}%)'.format(ibus, 
float(i)/float(len(allBuses))*100.0) 
 
                substationBuses = substation_list_from_bus(ibus) 
                substationBuses.sort() 
                checkedBuses += substationBuses 
     
                ierr, bName = psspy.notona(ibus) 
                substationName = bName[0:11].strip() 
                 
                with open(csvPath, 'ab') as f: 
                    writer = csv.writer(f) 
                    writer.writerow([substationName] + 
substationBuses) 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
    pass 
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APPENDIX E: TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT LOCATOR SCRIPT 
#!/usr/bin/env/python 
"""Determines appropriate donor transformers for each unit. 
 
This script contains function definitions leading up to  
find_donor_transformers(bsys) that, given subsystem with id of  
bsys, will determine which transformers within the subsystem are  
suitable donor transformers for each other unit in the  
subsystem. 
 
Requires Python 2.7 and PSS®E 33  
    -or- Python 2.5 and PSS®E 32 
""" 
 
import os, sys, numbers 
 
# Import PSS®E APIs 
psse_version = 33 
pssbin_path = 'C:\\Program Files 
(x86)\\PTI\\PSSE{0}\\PSSBIN'.format(psse_version) 
sys.path.append(pssbin_path) 
os.environ['PATH'] = (pssbin_path + ';' + os.environ['PATH']) 
import psspy, redirect, dyntools 
 
# Obtain PSS®E defaults 
_i = psspy.getdefaultint() 
_f = psspy.getdefaultreal() 
_s = psspy.getdefaultchar() 
redirect.psse2py() 
 
__author__ = 'Micah J. Till' 
__copyright__ = 'Copyright 2017' 
__version__ = "1.0.1" 
 
def two_winding_transformers(bsys): 
    TIES = 3 
    ierr, (xd0,) = psspy.atrnint(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, 1, 'FROMNUMBER') 
    ierr, (xd1,) = psspy.atrnint(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, 1, 'TONUMBER') 
    ierr, (xd2,) = psspy.atrnchar(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, 1, 'ID') 
    ierr, (xd3,) = psspy.atrnint(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, 1, 'STATUS') 
    if xd0 is not None: 
        twoWindingElements = zip(xd0, xd1, xd2, xd3) 
    else: 
        twoWindingElements = () 
    return twoWindingElements 
 
def three_winding_transformers(bsys): 
    TIES = 3 
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    ierr, (yd0,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, _i, 'WIND1NUMBER') 
    ierr, (yd1,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, _i, 'WIND2NUMBER') 
    ierr, (yd2,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, _i, 'WIND3NUMBER') 
    ierr, (yd3,) = psspy.atr3char(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, _i, 'ID') 
    ierr, (yd4,) = psspy.atr3int(bsys, _i, TIES, 2, _i, 'STATUS') 
    if yd0 is not None: 
        threeWindingElements = zip(yd0, yd1, yd2, yd3, yd4) 
    else: 
        threeWindingElements = () 
    return threeWindingElements 
 
def pri_sec_voltage_match(original, donor): 
    voltage_match = False 
     
    ierr, bv1a = psspy.busdat(original[0], 'BASE') 
    ierr, bv1b = psspy.busdat(original[1], 'BASE') 
    ierr, bv2a = psspy.busdat(donor[0], 'BASE') 
    ierr, bv2b = psspy.busdat(donor[1], 'BASE') 
    if max(bv1a, bv1b) == max(bv2a, bv2b): 
        if min(bv1a, bv1b) == min(bv2a, bv2b): 
            voltage_match = True 
             
    return voltage_match 
 
def mva_match(original_MVA_flow, donor_MVA_rating): 
    mva_match = False 
    if donor_MVA_rating >= original_MVA_flow: 
        mva_match = True 
    return mva_match 
 
def two_winding_mva_match(original, donor): 
    ierr, original_flow = psspy.brnmsc(original[0], original[1], 
original[2], 'MVA') 
 
    ierr, mvaA = psspy.brndat(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], 'RATEA') 
    ierr, mvaB = psspy.brndat(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], 'RATEA') 
    ierr, mvaC = psspy.brndat(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], 'RATEA') 
    ratings = [0] 
    for m in [mvaA, mvaB, mvaC]: 
        if isinstance(m, numbers.Number): 
            ratings.append(m) 
    donor_rating = max(ratings) 
     
    return mva_match(original_flow, donor_rating) 
 
def three_winding_mva_match(original, donor): 
    ierr, original_flow = psspy.wnddat(original[0], original[1], 
original[2], original[3], 'MVA') 
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    ierr, mvaA = psspy.wnddat(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], donor[3], 
'RATEA') 
    ierr, mvaB = psspy.wnddat(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], donor[3], 
'RATEB') 
    ierr, mvaC = psspy.wnddat(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], donor[3], 
'RATEC') 
    ratings = [0] 
    for m in [mvaA, mvaB, mvaC]: 
        if isinstance(m, numbers.Number): 
            ratings.append(m) 
    donor_rating = max(ratings) 
 
    return mva_match(original_flow, donor_rating) 
 
def imp_match(z_original, z_donor): 
    LIMIT_LOW = 1.0 
    LIMIT_HIGH = 1.2 
 
    imp_match = False 
    ratio = z_donor.imag / z_original.imag 
    if ratio >= LIMIT_LOW: 
        if ratio <= LIMIT_HIGH: 
            imp_match = True 
    return imp_match 
 
def two_winding_imp_match(original, donor): 
    ierr, z_original = psspy.brndt2(original[0], original[1], 
original[2], 'RX') 
    ierr, z_donor = psspy.brndt2(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], 'RX') 
 
    return imp_match(z_original, z_donor) 
 
def three_winding_imp_match(original, donor): 
    ierr, z1_original = psspy.wnddt2(original[0], original[1], 
original[2], original[3], 'RX') 
    ierr, z2_original = psspy.wnddt2(original[1], original[0], 
original[2], original[3], 'RX') 
    z_original = z1_original + z2_original 
     
    ierr, z1_donor = psspy.wnddt2(donor[0], donor[1], donor[2], 
donor[3], 'RX') 
    ierr, z2_donor = psspy.wnddt2(donor[1], donor[0], donor[2], 
donor[3], 'RX') 
    z_donor = z1_donor + z2_donor 
     
    return imp_match(z_original, z_donor) 
 
def find_donor_transformers(bsys): 
    txResults = [['Bus1', 'Bus2', 'Bus3', 'ckt', 'Replacements:' ]] 
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    two_winding_set = two_winding_transformers(bsys) 
    for tx2 in two_winding_set: 
        dataOrigTx = [tx2[0], tx2[1], 'None', tx2[2]] 
        dataReplTx = [] 
 
        for txB in two_winding_set: 
            if pri_sec_voltage_match(tx2, txB): 
                if two_winding_mva_match(tx2, txB): 
                    if two_winding_imp_match(tx2, txB): 
                        if not tx2 == txB: 
                            dataReplTx.append(txB) 
 
        if len(dataReplTx) < 1: 
            dataOrigTx.extend(['NONE']) 
        else: 
            dataOrigTx.extend(dataReplTx) 
        txResults.append(dataOrigTx) 
 
    three_winding_set = three_winding_transformers(bsys) 
    for tx3 in three_winding_set: 
        dataOrigTx = list(tx3[0:4]) 
        dataReplTx = [] 
 
        for txC in three_winding_set: 
            if pri_sec_voltage_match(tx3, txC): 
                if three_winding_mva_match(tx3, txC): 
                    if three_winding_mva_match(tx3, txC): 
                        if not tx3 == txC: 
                            dataReplTx.append(txC) 
 
        if len(dataReplTx) < 1: 
            dataOrigTx.extend(['NONE']) 
        else: 
            dataOrigTx.extend(dataReplTx) 
        txResults.append(dataOrigTx) 
 
    return txResults 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
    pass 
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